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INTRODUCTION 
Historical archives bulge with pertinent materials, 
but the subject of [Civil War intelligence operations] has 
been an especially neglected topic , neglected, that is, by 
all but the romancers. Present-day intelligence and security 
operations are highly sophisticated matters. The substantive 
discussions they provoke [usually segregated from the public 
by government classification] tend to be technical, even 
esoteric, and richly complicated by conflicting schools of 
thought. Relatively few persons outside the closed circle 
have gained enough understanding of the subject to write 
plausibly about it - let alone do historical research on it. 
As an aspect of Civil War history, the topic still awaits 
competent students, to say nothing of something approaching 
definitive treatment. 1 
This statement , written by Robert Dykstra in 1964, plus the 
availability of the Grenville Dodge Papers for such research prompted me 
to attempt a study of Dodge's Civil War intelligence operations. One 
of the major objectives of this thesis has been to place the romantic 
theme of Civil War intelligence in its proper perspective. Two of the 
earliest works on Civil War intelligence operations are Lafayette C. 
Baker's, History of the United States Secret Service (1867), and Allen 
Pinkerton's, Spy of the Rebellion; Being a True History of the Spy 
System of the United States Army During the Later Rebellion (1883). 
Baker served as chief detective for the Union War Department and 
Pinkerton served as chief detective for General Winfield Scott and later 
General George McClellan. Baker came under attack from critics who 
accused him of excessive arrests. His History of the United States 
Secret Service, is largely a defense of his tactics. It is meticulous 
but poorly organized. Pinkerton writes of his detectives' exploits 
during the war. However, to fill the gaps in his 500-page book, 
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Pinkerton began attributing super-human qualities to himself and his 
favorite detective Timothy Webster. In Pinkerton's book, one begins 
to see the romantic theme emphasized and the facts deemphasized. This 
led to the creation of many myths about t he Civil War intelligence. 
The romantic theme which begins with Pinkerton's Spy of the Rebellion 
is continued in such books as Louis A. Sigaud's Belle Boyd, Confederate 
~ (1945), and Mabel Frantz's book Full Many A Name: The Story of 
Sam Davis (1961). 
Three historians, Wilton P. Moore, Edwin Fishel and David Sparks 
led the way in dispelling the romantic myths of Civil War intelligence 
operations. Each of these historians published articles in Civil War 
History. The first to appear was Moore's, "The Provost Marshal Goes to 
War" (1959). Fishel's article, "The Mythology of Civil War Intelligence" 
and Sparks's article, "General Patrick's Progress: Intelligence and 
Security in the Army of the Potomac," both appeared in 1964. These 
articles were followed by John Bakeless's book, Spies of the Confederacy 
(1970). Bakeless, like Moore, Fishel, and Sparks does an excellent job 
of presenting a factual, well-balanced narrative, and a scholarly 
conclusion. I have tried to continue the type of history that these 
four historians began. Although a spy certainly led a more exciting 
life than the average soldier, a more important topic is the organization 
and the usefulness of intelligence operations. The following pages 
thus downplay the romantic a spects in favor of the more fundamental 
elements of Civil War espionage. 
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The first chapter deals with the overall organization of Dodge's 
intelligence operations. Dodge had an unusual ability to organize. 
It was largely through Dodge's capability that his secret service 
worked as well as it did. The second chapter provides a chronological 
narrative of Dodge's intelligence work in both the Vicksburg and Atlanta 
campaigns. This chapter shows not only the value of such intelligence 
operations to the Union efforts as a whole but also the extensive nature 
of Dodge's operations. The third chapter deals with the final phase of 
Dodge's intelligence work in the Department of Missouri. It was here 
that Dodge's counterintelligence (security) operations became a major 
part of his intelligence work. Missouri was also the area in which 
Dodge used his spies to combat the Indians of the plains, which had 
risen in response to Chivington's Massacre. 
The words "secret service" are misleading. One of the misconcep-
tions that has grown up over the years is that "there was an organization 
. F G S t S . "2 ln the ederal overnment known as the ecre ervlce .... An 
intelligence organization directed and organized on a national scale 
was non-existent during the Civil War. For this reason I have tried 
to avoid the use of the words "secret service." Dodge 1 s military 
intelligence operations was one of several such organizations operating 
in the Civil War. The Secret Service Division, as we know it today, was 
not created until July 1865, when Congress appropriated $10,000 for the 
use of the Secretary of the Treasury in "detecting and bringing to trial 
counterfeiters of treasury notes, bonds, or other United States 
securities."3 
4 
One final note should perhaps be made before proceeding. Several 
reasons motivated me to entitle this thesis: "Major-General Grenville 
M. Dodge's Military Intelli gence Operations Duri ng the Civil War." To 
do a thorough study of Dodge's intelligence work, this study has not 
been restricted to intelligence work done by spies. His spies, though 
the major element of his overall operations, were not his only source 
of information. Southern newspapers, refugees, prisoners, scouts, 
cavalry, and detectives all must be given credit if a truly complete 
picture is to be drawn from this study. The words "military intelligence" 
thus more accurately describe all parts of Dodge's intelligence 
operations. 
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Civil War History 10 (1964): 341-343. 
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CHAPTER I. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DODGE'S 
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 
On the day that Confederate shore batteries opened fire on Fort 
Sumter, Grenville Mellon Dodge was some nine hundred miles away celebrat-
ing his thirtieth birthday in Council Bluffs, Iowa. During the four years 
of War which followed the bombardment, Dodge rose from the rank of 
Colonel in the Fourth Iowa Infantry to 
that of Major-General commanding the Left 
Wing of the Sixteenth Army Corps, Army 
of Tennessee. Dodge served under 
Generals S. R. Curtis, John C. Fremont, 
Stephen A. Hurlbut, William T. Sherman, 
and Ulysses S. Grant. Each of these 
Generals complimented Dodge's ability 
as a soldier by supporting him for 
promotion. At the height of his military 
career, Dodge commanded twenty-one 
regiments and five batteries. 1 
· Dodge's personal life prior to the Civil War contained little to 
suggest that by the end of the War he would be described by Ulysses S. 
Grant as "an exceedingly efficient officer" and a "mos·t capable soldier. "2 
Dodge was born in Danvers, Massachusetts, on April 12, 1831. In 1845 
Dodge met Frederick Lander, son of Mrs. Edward Lander, who employed 
Dodge as a farmhand. Frederick Lander was a noted surveyor and civil 
engineer in Massachusetts and it was from this man that Dodge gained 
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his first experiences at surveying railroad routes. This interest 
continued throughout his life. In 1867 Dodge would become chief 
engineer for the Union Pacific Railroad .
3 
Dodge resolved to study engineering after having met and gained the 
friendship of Frederick Lander. In 1846 Dodge enrolled at Durham Academy 
in New Hampshire and by September, 1848, Dodge was able to enter Norwich 
University in eastern Vermont. Norwich University is deserving of mention 
since it was there that Dodge gained his formal military training. This, 
however, consisted of little more than simple drills and open field 
maneuvers; hardly sufficient training for what would be re~uired of him 
later. 4 
After graduating from Norwich, Dodge grew restless and, at the age 
of twenty headed west to seek his fortune, hopefully as an engineer. His 
first destination was Peru, Illinois, where he had been promised employ-
ment by Senator George W. Gilson, an Illinois railroad promoter. He 
surveyed railroad plots around Peru until 1852 when he secured new 
employment with the Rock Island Railroad. By May 17, 1853, Dodge and a 
survey party had reached Iowa City, on the route to be taken between 
Chicago and the city of Omaha. By November 23, 1853, Dodge was south 
of Council Bluffs. From Council Bluffs he proceeded into the Territory 
of Nebraska. Later in life, as his biographer states, "Dodge could brag 
that the routes he selected were adopted by the chief engineers of the 
first transcontinental railroad." 
Th.e next turning point in Dodge 1 s life occurred on May 29, 1854. 
After settling down in Iowa City for a time, Dodge was married to Ruth 
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Anne Brown. After a honeymoon in Boston, Dodge took his wife, and his 
own family, which had left Massachusetts for the West, to Elkhorn, 
twenty-three miles west of Omaha. Here Dodge continued to survey and 
in the process acquired valuable knowledge of Indians. Both the Omahas 
and Pawnees proved troublesome but Dodge and his family were able to 
survive. 5 
From this point on, Dodge established himself as a prominent 
citizen in Iowa. He lobbied the state legislature for the railroad 
and established a banking and real estate office in Council Bluffs. 
Yet in connection with his later military life, Dodge showed little in 
the way of promise. His contempories came to the same conclusion. 
An acquaintance said of him: "He seemed the average Civil Engineer, 
subordinate to his chief. I had no reason to anticipate for him much 
higher distinction. Still, he was self-asserting, and in some measure, 
egotistical. "6 
After Fort Sumter, Dodge sought the rank of colonel and a regiment 
to command. Believing war inevitable, he told his wife, "[t]he War 
[will] take .every fighting man into the field, and I would rather take 
a position of leader than hereafter be forced to be a follower."7 
Dodge's first attempt to raise a regiment failed. He approached 
Governor Samuel J. Kirkwood about the prospects of offering the 'Council 
Bluffs Guards' for active service in the Union Army. Kirkwood declined 
Dodge's proposal saying that Dodge lacked the necessary military 
experience and, more important, that the 'Council Bluffs Guards' were 
needed to protect Iowa's frontier against roving bands of Indians. 
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But Dodge persisted. After Kirkwood declined his offer, he hurried 
to Washington, D.C., to lay his proposal directly before Secretary of 
War Simon Cameron. But Cameron could not help Dodge either, for he 
could not supply Dodge with guns to arm his regiment. Cameron kindly 
offered Dodge an appointment as captain in the regular army, but Dodge 
just as kindly refused. Dodge was determined to lead a regiment in 
the volunteer army. 
Undismayed, Dodge left Secretary Cameron's office and went to the 
Ordnance Department. Dodge's luck changed here. He was informed that 
some six thousand Springfield muskets were lying unclaimed at a nearby 
depot. Dodge hurried back to Cameron with the news of the unclaimed 
muskets. Luckily Cameron not only handed over all the muskets, but 
also the position Dodge had sought all along - colonel of what later 
became the Fourth Iowa Infantry. His appointment was made official in 
June, 1861. By August, Dodge "was leading [the Fourth Iowa Infantry] 
against the rebels in Northern Missouri."8 
Dodge's lack of training in military science was offset by his 
natural ability to organize and lead men. After returning from 
Washington, he and his regiment were sent to Camp Kirh.wood, a "tent 
city" south of Council Bluffs. Here Dodge "drilled, paraded, and hiked" 
his men from 4:00 a.m. to 7:00p.m. Yet when his men worked so did 
Dodge. He was always with them. Soon he gained his men's respect as 
a "tough little fellow. "9 
Early in August, Dodge's regiment was ordered to report to St. Louis. 
After arriving there, General John C. Fremont, commander of the Department 
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of Missouri, ordered Dodge to Rolla, Missouri, where Dodge took command 
of the Fourth Brigade in the Fourth Division of the Army of the Southwest 
under GeneralS. R. Curtis. 10 
While at Rolla, Dodge led the successful attack on Springfield, 
Missouri. He also participated in the Battle of Pea Ridge, March 6-8, 
1862, losing over one-third of his command. Every field officer was 
killed and Dodge had three horses shot from under him . As a result of 
his actions in the battle, Major-General Halleck promoted Dodge to 
. . 11 
the rank of br1gad1er-general. 
While at Rolla, Dodge began to develop his intelligence operations. 
The development was triggered by war conditions following the Union defeat 
at Wilson's Creek. After the battle of August 10, "1861, the si t~ation 
for the Union forces in Missouri looked as bad as it did in the east. 
Federal forces under Brigadier-General Nathanial Lyon had been defeated 
by Confederate Generals Benjamin McCullock and Sterling Price. Lyon was 
killed during the battle but Major Samual D. Sturgis withdrew the Union 
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troops to Rolla where Dodge had been sent by General Fremont. 
Shortly after the fiasco at Wilson's Creek, General Fremont, who 
was in St. Louis, began receiving numerous reports of Confederate move-
ments toward the Federal lines. Jittery after t he defeat, Fremont asked 
Dodge to help investigate the rumors about Confederate advances. This 
assignment proved to be quite a task since each rock seemed to hide 
Confederate soldiers. 1 3 At f irst Dodge investigated the rumors by 
mounting all of his cavalry units and dispersing them anywhere 
Confederate activity was reported. Within a month, all of his horses 
11 
were worn out from chasing so many widely scattered reports. The system, 
he concluded, was unworkable. 14 
An alternative plan not only saved Dodge's cavalry but started 
Dodge's military intelligence system. Dodge is not responsible for the 
idea of sending spies into Confederate territory, however, One morning, 
a Captain White, who commanded an independent Missouri cavalry unit, came 
to Dodge's tent and complained about the ridiculous method Dodge was 
using to investigate all rumors of Confederate advances. White suggested 
sending some of this own men into the enemy's lines to obtain the desired 
information. By doing this Dodge would save the wear and tear on his 
cavalry units and free his cavalry for chasing down the guerrilla bands 
that constantly harassed his own lines. 15 
Dodge did send several of White's men into rebel territory. The 
men sent were truly worthy for the task since most were Missourians who 
knew the territory into which they went. Within a short time, they were 
returning to Dodge's headquarters at Rolla with reports that Dodge found 
very accurate.16 
Dodge was completely convinced of the advantages of using spies 
after participating in the campaigns in the southwest during the Spring 
of 1862. At Fayetteville, Arkansas, one of his spies brought in a report 
that Confederate General Earl Van Darn with 25,000 troops, "was right 
on top of" GeneralS. R. Curtis's 11,000 man army. 17 
This information was of tremendous importance. Curtis had pushed 
Sterling Price's army to Fayetteville in February, 1862. General Halleck 
had ordered Curtis to halt his army here and await relief from Union 
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forces which would come "through southeast Missouri down the Mississippi 
[River] and up the Tennessee [River]" to force the Confederates to with-
draw from Curtis's front. While waiting near Fayetteville, Curtis spread 
his army out over the countryside in order to obtain forage. This made 
him vulnerable to a concentrated Confederate attack. 
In the month that Curtis's army had stopped at Fayetteville, Earl 
Van Dorn assumed command of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi District 
and planned an immediate campaign from Arkansas into Missouri. Van Darn 
hope to join forces with Sterling Price who had fallen back to Spring-
field, Missouri, and then march directly on St. Louis. Van Darn joined 
forces with Price in the Boston Mountains below Feyetteville. His 
total force consisted of 30,000 men. 
On March 3, 1862, General Curtis learned of Van Darn's movements 
just south of him. This intelligence had been gained from refugees 
who had fled to Curtis's lines in the wake of the Confederate advance. 
This information was followed by reports from Dodge's spies telling 
Curtis exactly where Van Darn planned to attack his lines. 
On the 6th of March several of Dodge's "scouts" brought in the 
news that Van Darn planned to attack Curtis's rear by marching down the 
Little Cross Timber road. After hearing this, Dodge informed Curtis. 
Curtis sent Dodge and six companies of the Fourth Iowa Infantry and the 
Third Illinois Cavalry to Cross Timber Hollows. Here, Dodge had his men 
fell trees onto the road in order to slow the Confederate advance. His 
spies' reports proved to be accurate. Dodge was forced to abandon his 
tree cutting when Van Darn's army was heard coming down the road. 
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By following up on his spies' reports and felling trees on Little 
Cross Timber road, Dodge frustrated Van Darn's plans for a simultaneous 
attack.. While half of Van Dorn' s forces were halted by Dodge's fallen 
timber the other half of the Confederate forc e launched its attack. 
Curtis was therefore able to concentrate his outnumbered army where they 
were most needed. He held off Van Dorn and forced him to retreat to 
Memphis, Tennessee. In later years, Dodge credited his spies with 
saving Curtis's army. 18 
There was much more to Dodge's intelligence operation than a simple 
process of sending men into enemy lines. Much credit must be given to 
Dodge for his ingenuity in overcoming several obstacles. At Rolla and 
Fayetteville, Dodge had become convinced that military intelligence gave 
an officer many advantages. Yet Dodge, in order to have a truly effective 
intelligence operation had to overcome many problems. In meeting and 
overcoming these, Dodge developed an effective intelligence organization. 
One of the first problems Dodge encountered was finance. When he 
discovered that the War Department had no funds available for his secret 
service, Dodge sought aid from his provost marshal, J. W. Barnes. Barnes 
had collected some money from "fines" and confiscations, but this was 
still inadequate.l9 On January 3, 1863, Dodge wrote to Ulysses S. Grant 
requesting permission to retain all proceeds from the sale of contraband 
cotton for the purpose of financing his intelligence operations. Grant 
consented, probably because the sale of cotton had caused him a great 
many problems.20 
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The cotton market had nndergone a "boom" during the war years. 
Prices soared as the rebels held on to cotton and made it a rather 
scarce commodi.ty in the North. Many northerners realized that the South, 
on the other h_and, was short of many items such as "coffee, medicines, 
w:hlskey, flour, salt, and ... an endless list of manufactured goods." 
There w:ere many from both North and South who took advantage of the 
s.i tuation. Extensive trade in "contraband" cotton was carried on by 
both sections throughout the war. 
Grant realized that southerners used the proceeds from the sale of 
cotton to purchase salt, beef, pork, and weapons in order to keep their 
armies in the field. The Administration overruled him, however, every 
time he attempted to curb the illegal trade. Undoubtedly, Dodge's 
request to use contraband cotton as the financial support for his 
intelligence operations was a welcome relief. 21 
The fact that Dodge's spies were paid from the proceeds of cotton 
sales suggests that they held a special station in the army. Further 
evidence of this can be seen in an incident which occurred at Corinth, 
Mississippi in 1863. Major-General Stephen A. Hurlbut, Dodge's immediate 
supervisor at Corinth, demanded that Dodge hand over the names of his 
spies, their reports, and their locations. 
Dodge could not obey these orders. He feared that if Hurlbut was 
given the information requested, there existed the possibility that the 
enemy might get hold of it. This would not only ruin his intelligence 
operations, but more importantly, sentence all his spies to imprisonment 
or death.22 
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General Grant was the only person who could resolve this dilemma. 
Dodge wrote to him, asking that Hurlbut's order be countermanded. 
Grant soon "took time from the fighting at Vicksburg to rescind the 
order." However, Grant did ask Dodge t o send his intelligence information 
to commanders who might be affected by it. In sum, Dodge was not required 
to divulge the intricacies of his intelligence operations, such as spies' 
names, spy reports, and their locations. He was to write up a general 
intelligence report for the use of other Union commanders if they were 
affected by such information.23 
Grant had little knowledge of Dodge's spies. But he fully appreci-
ated the information he was getting from Dodge. No other organization 
was able to work so closely with the Army and yet remain so anonymous. 
Dodge's intelligence work required such secrecy if his was to be an 
effective organization. 
A second problem that Dodge had to overcome in the development of 
his intelligence operations was accuracy and uniformity in his spies' 
reports. Accuracy was, of course, a determining factor for judging the 
usefulness of his operations. One problem that vexed Dodge was the 
tendency of his untrained spies to exaggerate the numbers of troops 
they saw. This posed a serious problem. Dodge, however, devised a plan 
by which his spies' reports were not only made more accurate but also 
more uniform. 
Since most of the information Dodge sought was military in nature, 
Dodge trained his spies to distinguish "a company, a regiment, division, 
or corps," and the rank of Confederate officers, not by count, but by 
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studied glance. Dodge accomplished this by simply showing them the 
space that each military group would take up on a road. 
Spies w.ere also trained to estimate t he number of troops being 
moved by train. Dodge showed his spies the different types of train 
cars.. Each of the types could hold different numbers of troops. For 
instance, a freight car could hold more troops than either a baggage 
or passenger car. Dodge's spies were told the capacity of each type 
and memorized the information. They then simply counted the number of 
passenger, freight, or baggage cars in a given train, multiplied this 
number by the total capacity for each type of car and arrived at an 
24 accurate troop strength report. 
Dodge also taught his spies how to answer questions of Confederate 
officers. If a spy was detained, he or she was to tell the truth. As 
Dodge put it, a rule for a captured spy w.as "never tell a lie about our 
forces, avoid telling all he could, but whatever he did tell to tell 
the truth. "25 
In order to help spies avoid suspicion Dodge would often give them 
contraband which was badly needed by the Confederacy or letters addressed 
to people in the South from prisoners he had captured. If a spy was 
stopped, which many were, he had in his possession items that only loyal 
southerners would normally carry.26 
Though Dodge instructed his spies on how to report accurately and 
gave them convincing contraband, he could not teach them how to avoid 
capture. Once a spy had been captured, detection meant death. A cavalry 
unit sent to rescue a spy could do more harm than good. If it failed, 
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its action would lead the enemy to conclude that the person held by 
them was not an ordinary prisoner of war. It was best for the spy to 
admit to being anything but a spy. Spies were usually hung whereas 
many prisoners of war were exchanged or paroled during the war. 27. 
Most spies, from the time they left their lines until they returned, 
had to rely on their own resources. Dodge did give them all the aid he 
could yet he realized that their fate was dependent on what was found 
on them and how convincing their story seemed. Not much else could be 
done. An example of this can be been in the following message. General 
S. A. M. Wood, commander of all Confederate forces in the vicinity of 
Bear Creek, in Tennessee, had apparently captured some of Dodge's men, 
whom he suspected of being spies. Even though Wood threatened to hang 
two of Dodge's men for every man that Dodge hung, Dodge remained unmoved-
at least outwardly: 
Your communication of April lst [1863], by flag of truce, 
arrived at my lines today; and in answer I have to say that 
James Niel is held by us as a prisoner of war, and treated as 
such. How you obtained such information I am unable to sur-
mise, as there is no foundation for it. Your threat to hang 
two men for one is given its proper weight. Our Government 
never hangs men without good and sufficient cause (I wish I 
could say the same of yours) and when it decides 'lpon hanging 
men the threats of Confederate officers count nothing. We 
have no fears of the old story of retaliation.28 
It is easy to see that General Wood did a disservice to James Niel. 
By mentioning his name, he undoubtedly drew undue attention to Niel. In 
his reply, Dodge did not make the same mistake. He never mentioned any 
specific name, if indeed Wood had mentioned them in his first message 
to Dodge. 
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A spy's work was quite hazardous. For instance, during the war 
Dodge was careful about whom he selected for such work. In his Personal 
Biography, Dodge wrote. that "only men of pecul iar gifts for such service, 
men of courage and cool judgment and undoubted [loyalty] were selected 
[as spies]."29 
The following report written by Dodge's provost marshal and submitted 
to him on December 11, 1862, shows that Dodge did evaluate his spies in 
an effort to weed out those individuals who did not possess the needed 
characteristics of a spy: 
Col. Wray has made several good trips to Columbia, 
Jackson, and Grenada [Mississippi]; Tuscumbia and Florence, 
Alabama. Philip Henson made good trips to Chattanooga and 
New Albany. Dr. Stout has served but, I think does not make 
any more trips ... Joseph Palmer has made several trips, but I 
think is inclined to play-off and not go as far as he 
30 represents .... 
Both Dr. Stout and Joseph Palmer were not employed after this report 
had been submitted to Dodge. Philip Henson, who received a much better 
evaluation, went on to become Dodge's most trusted spy.31 
Dodge's selectivity was undoubtedly prompted not only by the fact 
that a spy's work was dangerous but also because he valued military 
intelligence quite highly. In fact, the importance that Dodge placed on 
military intelligence can be seen in the way he treated enemy spies 
caught within his own lines. In the case of two Confederate spies, their 
death sentences were carried out in a summary manner. Even the official 
transcripts of both men's trials had not reached Washington before the 
trap door on t!Le s.~affold had dropped from under their feet. 32 
19 
Dodge justified this type of treatment when he wrote: 
The severe penalty of death, where a spy is captured 
is not because there is anything dishonorable in the fact 
of ... being a spy, but .... the probability of great danger to 
an army is what causes the penalty to be so very severe. 
A soldier caught in the uniform or part of the uniform of 
his enemy •.. establishes the f act that he is aSP¥ and is 
there[fore] in violation of the Articles of War.j3 
In recruiting his spies, Dodge's first preference was southern 
unionists. In his first experience with the secret service at Rolla, 
Dodge had used southerners who were familiar with the territory into 
which they were sent. By using these people he created less suspicion 
on the part of the Confederates. His spies often remained inside enemy 
lines, their homes, during the entire War.34 
Some of the most successful spies of the Civil War were women. 
Names such as Mrs. Rose O'Neale Greenhaw, Isabelle (Belle) Boyd, Nancy 
Hart, and Pauline Cushman were among the most well known. Dodge also 
recruited women for his spy operations. Like his use of southern union-
ists, Dodge undoubtedly reasoned that a woman was less likely to arouse 
suspicion than were men.35 
One of the first women Dodge used was Mary Malone. On June l, 
1863, she was paid the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars for secret 
service missions into Selma, Alabama, and Meridian, Columbus, and Okolona, 
Mississippi. By July 25, 1863, she had made additional trips to Jackson, 
Meridian, and Columbus, Mississippi. The dates and location of her 
missions suggest that she was sent to these places in order to detect 
Confederate troop movements eastward. Vicksburg was surrounded at this 
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time by Grant's army. It was Dodge's order to watch for any Confederate 
attempts to relieve that city.36 
Jane Featherstone also made a trip to Jackson, Mississippi, at 
about the same time that Mary Malone had been there. She returned 
through Pontotoc County and on June 1, 1863, she too was paid two hundred 
and fifty dollars. Her trip to Jackson was to watch Confederate troop 
movements eastward as was Malone's. There is no certain reason why 
Featherstone returned through Pontotoc County; however, Dodge filed 
reports on July 7, and August 18, 1863, that told of Confederate troop 
concentrations consisting of six regiments, two battalions, and one 
brigade in and around that area.37 
Mary McPitman did not serve with Dodge until late in the war. The 
story of this woman's service, however, shows the advantage of using a 
woman spy. McPitman submitted an itemized account of her expenses after 
completing a £ecret service mission. From March 1-31, 1865, she spent 
seven dollars on "wine and cake." The last entry is most interesting, 
however, "extra supper given to rebels in her room--$10.00." She was 
paid three hundred and fifty dollars for her services.38 
A fourth woman had her secret service activities cut short. While 
on a mission into the city of Columbus, Mississ i ppi, Mary Mainard was 
detected by the Confederates. She was captured by General Ruggles and 
locked up in prison in that city . Phi lip Henson, Dodge's best spy, was 
able to visit Miss Mainard whi le she was in prison but nothing could be 
done for the "poor girl . " Mary Mainard remained in Confederate hands 
until after the war. 39 
21 
Three other women were also connected with Dodge's secret service 
operations. Very little is known about them. Rebecca Prater was dis-
charged at Kansas City, Missouri, by Dodge' s Special Order No. 138. 
She had been paid fifty dollars a month f or her services. No records 
exist as to the actual number of months she served. 40 Two sisters, Mary 
and Jenny Thompson often aided Dodge's spy, Philip Henson, though there 
is no further indication that Dodge officially employed them in his 
operations.41 
Selectivity, accuracy and uniformity in reporting were of great 
importance to Dodge's secret service. Of equal importance to these was 
secrecy. The conflict between Major-General Hurlbut and Dodge has 
already been cited as an example of the special station the secret service 
held in the army. This same incident can also be used to emphasize the 
extent to which General Dodge would go to insure the secrecy of his 
intelligence activities. Dodge would never have disobeyed his commander 
if he did not feel secrecy was of utmost importance. Still further 
evidence of this is the fact that in 1901, forty-four years after the 
Civil War had ended, Dodge hesitated to divulge the true identities of 
his spies to the public.42 
In any secret service operation, secrecy was important. Dodge went 
to extremes in order to insure that very few men knew the details of his 
intelligence operations. Few of his own staff knew that Dodge used spies. 
Two provost marshals, Captai n Cameron and J. H. Baker, and Dodge's 
adjutant-generals, J. W. Barnes and Colonel George E. Spencer, were the 
only men that worked closely with Dodge's intelligence operations.43 
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There are several incidents which indicate that Dodge was successful 
in keeping his intelligence operations secret. For instance, his soldiers 
thought his scouts acted as his sole source of intelligence.44 Another 
testimonial to the secrecy of his secret service operations occurred when 
one of his spies was arrested by Union soldiers from another command. 
This man was charged with being a thief. It took a "strong" letter from 
both Dodge and General William T. Sherman to free him.45 
To insure complete secrecy Dodge substituted numbers or letters 
for his spies' names. These numbers or letters served as a recognizable 
code to Dodge alone. Names were dropped. For instance, in a small book 
entitled "Report of Spies," the entry designating Philip Henson is the 
letter "H".46 
Dodge's service employed more than a hundred spies, yet Dodge wrote 
their names only once. This was done on a single piece of paper. 
Though this paper does not exist today, it is known that a typical entry 
contained the spy's real name and his or her corresponding code designa-
tion. Dodge knew that if this paper fell into the enemy's hands, he 
would literally be sentencing over a hundred men and women to death, 
imprisonment, or both. For this reason Dodge always carried his list of 
spies on his person.47 
In order further to insure secrecy, Dodge worked out a system by 
which his spies could communicate with him indirectly. The reason for 
such a system was the simple fact that the less often the spy had to come 
to see Dodge personally, the less chance he took of being suspected and 
detected. Dodge ordered his spies to stay within Confederate lines as 
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long as possible. It was hard enough for a spy to enter Confederate 
territory and even harder to get out. The Confederates were quite 
suspicious of persons going in the direction of Union lines.48 
Early in the war, Dodge formed the First Alabama Colored Infantry 
and Cavalry Regiments. These regiments consisted of ex-slaves who had 
flocked to Dodge's lines. Dodge was able to communicate with his spies 
through many families and relatives of these regiments. 
Dodge instructed his spies to deliver their secret reports to the 
families of a soldier in either the First Alabama Cavalry or Infantry 
Regiments. Most of these families continued to reside within the 
Confederacy. In turn, the family member receiving the report, was to 
come into Dodge's lines on the pretext of "seeing their people." After 
arriving at Dodge's headquarters, the family member would go directly 
to Dodge's tent obstensibly to ask his permission to visit his or her 
relative. While inside his tent, he or she would hand the spy's report 
to Dodge. Dodge, of course, granted permission to visit with the 
relative and no suspicions were aroused.49 
The system of indirect communication helped both the spy and 
General Dodge. Through such a system, the spy's risk of detection was 
lessened. Spies were not required to risk getting in and out of 
Confederate lines and by handing their reports over to these families 
they ridded themselves of any incriminating evidence. Dodge, on the other 
hand, probably received more reports through the families of the Alabama 
regiments than would have been the case had his spies been required to 
deliver them personally. 
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Most of Dodge's spy reports went to Ulysses S. Grant, William T. 
Sherman, and General Hurlbut only after Dodge collected them and put 
them in their proper order. To prevent their detection Dodge sent most 
of his reports in cipher. There is no evidence of the code used by 
Dodge but more than likely it was the "Route Cipher," the code most 
commonly used by the Union Army. The "Route Cipher" was made up of 
"a number of [word] columns" which were read either up or down depending 
on the key which was prearranged between the communicators. This code 
was very effective. The Confederates often were so puzzled by it that 
they would put an intercepted message in local southern newspapers in 
the hope that some citizen could decode it.5° 
Though in later years Dodge described his spies as extremely 
dependable, he nevertheless had several ways of checking their reports. 
One way was seldom to rely on the report of a single spy. He usually 
sent two spies who were not aware of each other, into the same location. 
This was done in order to prevent spies from collaborating and turning 
in false reports. If, upon their return, their reports showed 
discrepancies, the information would either be discarded or rechecked 
by still another spy. Dodge also questioned slaves and prisoners about 
locations or future plans of Confederate armies and compared this 
· information with that of the spies. If all reports checked out, Dodge 
would then forward his own report to Union officers affected by it. 
By using two spies in one area Dodge sought accuracy but also 
intended to avoid falling victim to Confederate counterintelligence. 
Dodge knew much about counterintelligence work, since his best spy 
25 
posed as a scout for no less than four Confederate generals. It was 
much easier to detect a counterspy if Dodge had two reports from .spies 
in the same location.51 
Dodge also used sources other than his spies for gaining intelligence 
information. Slaves and prisoners served as good sources. Another 
valuable source was the southern newspapers. Newspapers were of value 
to both sides during the war. Confederate and Union officers often spent 
considerable time each day pouring through the enemy's newspapers. A 
common practice among spies of the Civil War was to bring all the news-
papers they could when returning to their own lines.52 
One of the most interesting bits of information brought to Dodge, 
came from the Selma Dispatch. One of Dodge's spies returning from 
Alabama delivered it to him. The least that could be said about it is 
that it was a good forecast of what happened at Ford's Theatre on 
April 14, 1865: 
One million dollars wanted to have [p]eace by the lst 
of March. If the citizens of the Southern Confederacy will 
furnish me with cash, or good securities for the sume [sic] 
of one million dollars, I will cause the lives of Abrham [sic] 
Lincoln, William H. Seward, and Andrew Johnson to be taken 
by the first of March next. This will give peace, and 
satisfy the world that cruel tyrants cannot live in a land 
of liberty. If this is not accomplished nothing will be 
claimed beyond the sum of fifty thousand dollars, in advance, 
which is supposed to be necessary to reach and slaughter 
the three villians. 
I will give myself one thousand dollars toward this 
patriotic purpose. Everyone wishing to contribute will 
address Box X, Cabba, Alabama, December lst, 1864.53 
Few personal accounts from Dodge's spies exist. One that does is 
about Dodge's best spy, Philip Henson. Henson served Dodge during the 
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height of his secret service activity. The following account lends some 
color to the history of Dodge's secret service and seems to be a typical 
example of what many of Dodge's spies endured while serving in the war. 
As Dodge put it: "hundreds of these secret service men went through 
similar experiences." 
Like most of his spies, Henson was a southern unionist. Born in 
Jackson County, Alabama, he moved around in the South until he finally 
established his permanent home in Rienzi, just fifteen miles south of 
Corinth, Mississippi.54 Dodge first met Henson late in 1862. Henson 
had been employed as a spy under General Rosecrans but Dodge convinced 
Henson to work under him. From this time on, Henson worked solely for 
Dodge. 
Dodge soon found that Henson had a natural ability for spying. 
Henson, in turn, found Dodge generous. Dodge gave Henson a beautiful 
horse after the latter had returned from a mission to Vicksburg. For 
another trip, Henson received one thousand dollars in cash.55 
During his career Henson was able to convince Generals Ruggles, 
Gholson, Ferguson, and for a while General Forrest, that he was loyal 
to the Confederacy. There were certain advantages to working in such 
a manner. For instance, Henson received a separate pass from each 
general. This allowed him a wide range of freedom while operating within 
Confederate lines.56 
Dodge also gave Henson a pass. In Confederate territory possession 
of it meant certain death. To avoid meeting such a fate Henson carved 
out an area in the stock of his pistol. When he entered Confederate 
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territory he would remove a brass piece which covered the carved out 
area, placed the pass inside, and then replaced the brass cover.57 
Henson's career as a spy ended in the spri ng of 1864. Though 
Henson had convinced most of the Confederates of his loyalty, Nathan 
Bedford Forrest, through some intuition, became convinced that Henson 
was a spy. 
In the spring of 1864 Henson was sent into Confederate lines on his 
last mission. While near Tupelo, Mississippi, he was detained by some 
of Forrest's men. He was brought in front of Forrest and soon was sent 
on his way, under guard, to Meridian, Alabama, to face Confederate 
General S. D. Lee.58 
At Meridian he was brought in front of General Lee. During the 
course of their conversation, Lee asked Henson where he had seen him 
before. Henson, as was Dodge's rule, told Lee the truth. He had been 
released at Tuscaloosa, Alabama, by Lee in April, because of lack of 
evidence. 59 
Henson was taken to a local blacksmith's shop in Meridian. Shackles 
were placed on his feet. These were then fastened together by three 
chain links "which permitted a play of only six inches" to his legs. 
Heavy handcuffs were also placed on his hands, all owing him two inches 
of movement.6° 
His next destination was Mobile by train. While on his way there, 
his shackles and handcuffs remained on. To further insure that Henson 
could not escape, he was put in a freight car which contained poultry 
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coops. Henson was forced to the top of these where it took constant 
care to balance himself during the unsteady train ride. The Confederates 
placed a "fierce English Bulldog" directly beneath him. Henson knew that 
if he fell the dog would kill him. There was no way to protect himself 
since his handcuffs and leg irons held him tightly.6l 
At Mobile, Henson was taken to the 
"Hitchcock Press" or as it was otherwise 
known "the sweat box." This was a very 
small jail with no ventilation to speak 
of. In addition to his shackles and 
handcuffs, a sixty-four pound ball was 
attached to his ankles.62 
While he was in prison, General 
Forrest sent some of his men to Rienzi 
and arrented Henson's wife. She was 
unaware of her husband's activities and 
so could not tell Forrest anything that 
could endanger her husband. She remained 
under arrest for four months.63 
Dodge did all that he could for 
Henson. The following is self-explanatory: 
--.. ·-·---. - .. ~ 
THE S PY I~ CHAIXS . 
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt this day 
of your [letter] of the 11th enclosing letter in regard to 
your former scout Philip Hanson [sic]; Brig. Genl. Grierson 
leaves here tomorrow morning with a cavalry expedition, I 
have requested him to effect the release of Hanson [sic] if 
possible. If any of the family come to me,
6
l will do all in 
my power, and will bear the matter in mind. 
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Before she was arrested, Mrs. Henson had visited Dodge to get 
money for an attorney to defend Henson in court. Dodge provided these 
funds. Ironically, the attorney hired by Mrs. Henson was Benjamin Davis, 
a nephew of Confederate President Jef fe rson Davis.65 
Forrest was never able to produce any evidence against Henson. No 
doubt one of the reasons was that Henson never wrote anything down on 
paper. On February 17, 1865, Henson was released from his shackles, 
handcuffs and ball. He was then ordered to show his loyalty to the 
Confederacy by enlisting in his choice of regiments.66 
He chose the 24th Mississippi stationed near Richmond. On his way 
to join this regiment, a Colonel Rogers "winked at his escape." After 
an arduous journey of some three hundred miles, Henson finally reached 
Dodge in St. Louis, Missouri. He was so emaciated Dodge could hardly 
recognize him.67 
Henson's wife had returned to their home in Rienzi about two weeks 
before he got there. Henson was never sent on a mission again. One of 
the last letters Dodge received from him is dated May 8, 1865. In it 
Henson hints that he fears his family will be endangered when it is 
discovered that he was a Yankee spy. To avoid this he offered to go 
with Dodge on a "campaign in Texas" if Dodge would help him move his 
family to the North.6S Henson never moved however. He lived out the 
remainder of his life in the South.69 
Much credit is given to Dodge for the development and organization 
of his intelligence operations. It is true that the original idea of a 
secret service came from Colonel White of an independent Missouri cavalry 
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at Rolla. Yet it was General Dodge who took White's idea and developed 
it into a working organization. 
Dodge developed a secret service organization that held the potential 
for being very effective. Dodge taught his spies to be quick and accurate 
in reporting. He developed a communication system which both lessened 
the risks to the spy and helped maintain the general secrecy of his 
organization. Dodge also developed a system by which his spies' reports 
could be checked for validity and at the same time prevent the possibility 
of being infiltrated by a Confederate counterspy. Dodge truly developed 
an organization which could be of utmost importance in the war. 
Dodge not only ran an effective organization, but he also tried to 
aid his spies in all ways possible. Much, however, depended on the spy 
himself. Dodge went to extremes in financing and maintaining the secrecy 
of his spies. He taught them how to withstand Confederate interrogation, 
was particular in who he hired, and sent them into enemy lines loaded 
with convincing contraband. Once the spy had left his lines, however, 
Dodge knew that the spy was on his own. Personal ability would get him 
through. 
It would seem from all this that if Dodge's intelligence operations 
were to fail it would be for reasons other than organization. But an 
organization was not enough. The system had to produce intelligence, 
and in the most crucial moments of the war: at Vicksburg and Atlanta. 
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CHAPTER II. 
DODGE'S SECRET SERVICE IN THE 
FIELD, VICKSBURG AND ATLANTA 
In February 1862, Union forces under General Grant besieged 
and captured Fort Donelson, Tennessee. Tennessee was now opened for 
Union invasion. Kentucky, which was important to Union strategy, was 
secured.l 
The fall of Fort Donelson was followed by the Battle of Pittsburg 
Landing (Shiloh) in April, 1862. Corinth, Mississippi, described by 
Grant as "the junction of the two most important railroads in the 
Mississippi Valley ... the great strategic position at the West between 
the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers and between Nashville and Vicksburg" 
was occupied by Federal troops on May 31, 1862. 2 All of these events 
were significant for Dodge and his intelligence operations for it 
brought them out of Missouri and put them in a position where they could 
perform for Grant's army. After the fall of Corinth the question to be 
answered was: could Dodge and his secret service help Grant capture 
Vicksburg? 
In June, 1862, Dodge received orders to proceed to Columbus, 
Kentucky for further orders. After arriving, he was told that his assign-
ment was to rebuild the Mobile and Ohio Railroad between Columbus and 
Corinth. The distance was approximately 150 miles. Earlier, Confederate 
raiders had torn up the line, to prevent the Federal army from using it 
to supply its forces. Grant, however, wanted this line in operating 
condition in order to move supplies to his army as it marched towards 
Vicksburg.3 
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The Confederate cavalry made several attempts to stop Dodge's work. 
Generals Nathan B. Forrest and William H. Jackson made lightning-like 
raids along the line killing Dodge's pickets and wrecking his bridges. 
In order to protect his men Dodge came up wi th the idea of building 
two-story blockhouses all along the line. This was done. Grant was so 
impressed with these that he had others built on other lines. The 
following is the best description of these houses; 
Because the upper and lower floors faced in different 
directions, men within these structures could see any enemy 
approaching from any point. Within a blockhouse, a company 
of soldiers could hold off a regiment of attackers and 
could be overpowered only with artillery, which southern 
raiders seldom possessed ... Forrest and other Confefrerate 
officers failed to destroy any of Dodge's bridges. 
While working on the Columbus and Ohio Railroad near Humboldt, 
Tennessee, Dodge received orders to report at Corinth immediately. Dodge 
did exactly as he was told, not even taking time to change from his work 
clothes. There he met General Grant.5 
Grant told Dodge that he was to take command of the Second Division 
of the Army of Tennessee at Corinth. Within a month Dodge received more 
orders. This time he was told to take over command of the entire 
"district of Corinth ... and guard Grant's left flank."6 
Grant had other military matters to take care of. From Corinth, 
he went to Jackson, Tennessee, and there began preparations to capture 
Vicks.burg. Memphis had fallen to the Union on June 6, 1862. Now 
Vicksburg was the only Confederate stronghold left on the Mississippi 
River. By doing this the Confederacy would be cut in half.7 
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On November 2, 1862, General Grant notified General Halleck that 
he inte.nde.d to commence his campaign against Vicksburg. His plan was to 
leave with three divisions from Corinth and two from Bolivar, Tennessee. 
With this force Grant intended to r ebuild the railroad and telegraph 
lines as far as Holly Springs or Grenada, Mississippi. 8 
In December 1862, Dodge was told he would not go with Grant. Grant's 
intentions were that Dodge remain at Corinth. As Grant began his move-
ment towards Vicksburg, Confederate General Braxton Bragg and his army 
were near Chattanooga, Tennessee, some 180 miles northeast of Corinth. 
Grant feared that if Dodge's command were not left at Corinth, Bragg 
would be able to approach his own army from the flank and rear unopposed. 
Therefore, Grant assigned Dodge the job of keeping his forces between 
Meridian and Corinth.9 
Dodge was disappointed in not being able to go to Vicksburg yet he 
was not completely left out of the campaign. On November 18, 1862, Grant 
sent the following telegram to Dodge: 
Can you get information from the East, say as far 
as Florence [Alabama]? I want to hear from along the 
Tennessee [River] from Tuscumbia eastward to know if any 
rebel troops are crossing there.lO 
Four days later, John Rawlins, Grant's Chief of St aff, sent a second 
telegram: 
A dispatch from General Rosecrans, of date Nashville, 
Tennessee, November 21, 1862 , just received, says there are 
some indications that the rebels are attempting to cross the 
Tennessee from the east; that signs to that effect reached 
him that night. You will send out spies and scouts east and 
obtain all the information possible.ll 
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These two orders are important. In both messages Dodge was ordered 
to send General Grant information of any Confederate troop movements from 
east to west. Dodge, therefore, concentrated hi s spies to the east of 
Vicksburg . Toward the close of the Vicksburg campaign, Joseph E. 
Johnston's army threatened Grant's rear. With Johnston's appearance to 
the east, Grant put Dodge's intelligence reports to use. With the aid 
of Dodge's intelligence reports, Grant reinforced Sherman's army, facing 
Johnston in the east, with reinforcements equal to those Johnston 
received. Grant, at the same time, was able to command a separate army 
around Vicksburg and eventually force General Pemberton to surrender. 
Dodge then had two assignments. The first was to keep the Confed-
erates busy to prevent them from attacking Grant's rear. The second 
was to use his secret service in order to send information of Confederate 
troops movements from the east. 
Grant was not the only general who had asked Dodge for the aid of 
his intelligence operations. Generals Rosecrans and C. S. Hamilton 
ordered Dodge to send spies into the lower South as early as October, 
1862. Dodge complied. He sent James Lightner and James Marshall to 
Columbus, Mississippi. Marshall spent the first ten days of November 
in Jackson and Columbus. Lightner went t o both cities in October. Dodge 
also sent William A. Melvin to Vicksburg, Jackson, and Grenada, 
Mississippi, in October. A doctor, J oseph Stout was sent to Columbus 
and Jackson in November, 1862 .12 
Both Rosecrans and Hamilton were after similar intelligence. 
Rosecrans's army was north of Chattanooga. Facing his army to the south 
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was General Bragg's at Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Rosecrans was no doubt 
interested in enemy troop buildups. Confederate General Holmes was 
four hundred miles. west, near Little Rock, Arkansas at this time, and 
General John C. Pemberton was four hundre d miles southwest of Murfrees-
boro, near Vicksburg. The city of Columbus was near the Mobile and Ohio 
Railroad, some three hundred miles south of Murfreesboro. Grenada was 
situated on the junction of the Mississippi and Tennessee, and New 
Orleans, and the Jackson and Great Northern Railroads, about three 
hundred and fifty miles west of Murfreesboro. Grenada and Columbus would 
most likely have been areas from which the Confederates would move troops 
northward. General Hamilton commanded the center of Grant's army. He 
was undoubtedly interested in the same type of information that Grant had 
asked for in his telegram of November 18th: Confederate troop movements 
from the east.l3 
On November 8, 1862, Grant's troops occupied Grand Junction and 
La Grange, Tennessee. By November 13th Grant's cavalry occupied Holly 
Springs, Mississippi. Here Grant halted his army. In the middle of 
November he went to Columbus for a conference with General William T. 
Sherman. Sherman was ordered to march two divisions QuWn the Mississippi 
Central Railroad. On December 8, Grant then gave Sherman command of all 
forces east of the Mississippi River a,t Memphis. Sherman was ordered 
to moye his troops dow the Mis-sissippi to Vicksburg, and with Flag 
Officer David Porter, to "proceed to the reduction of that place. "14 
On November 24, 1862, at about the time Sherman was headed towards 
Vicksburg, Joseph E. Johnston was given command of Bragg's, Pemberton's, 
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and Holmes's armies. In a letter to Richmond, Johnston suggested a 
future plan for his armies: 
... Our two armies on this side of the Mississippi have 
the further disadvantage of being separated by the Tennessee 
River, and a Federal army [Grant ' s ] l arger, probably, than 
either of them. Under such circumstances it seems to me 
that our best course would be to fall upon Grant with the 
troops of Lieutenant-Generals Holmes [Little Rock, Arkansas] 
and Pemberton [Vicksburg] united for the purpose; those 
of General Bragg [Tennessee] co-operating; if practicable. 
The defeat of Grant would enable us to hold the Mississippi, 
and permit Lieutenant-General Holmes to move into Missouri. 
As our troops are now distributed, Vicksburg is in danger.l5 
Johnston's plans were of great portent for Grant. He had hoped to 
fight Pemberton alone. Then, if he were successful, he would turn to 
the next Confederate army and so on. As Grant stated, "Pemberton's 
force in my front was the main part of the garrison of Vicksburg ... I 
hoped to hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rear 
and into Vicksburg. "16 
While Generals Grant and Sherman moved towards Vicksburg, Dodge 
stayed at Corinth. His position here was a little less than two hundred 
miles southwest of Bragg's army at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and some two 
hundred fifty miles northeast of Pemberton's army at Vicksburg. At 
Corinth Dodge kept his soldiers busy fortifying the city. He also began 
sending his spies out to several locations east of Vicksburg. From these 
locations Dodge hoped to pick up Confederate movements towards Grant's 
rear. 
Reports from Dodge's spies began coming in during December. On 
December 13, 1862, Dodge sent word to Grant that refugees from Alabama 
had told of seeing 11,000 troops on the way to join General Pemberton 
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at Vicksburg. These troops were moving over "the Meridian and 
Chattanooga road." Dodge followed up this report. He sent a small 
cavalry unit into northern Alabama but his men reported seeing no troops 
from Bragg's army. They did see small bands of Confederate cavalry 
foraging along the roads.l7 
Dodge's first intelligence of much importance was sent to General 
Sullivan on December 18, 1862: 
One of my men arrived now. Left Shelbyville 
[Tennessee] Friday; Columbus Saturday; went to Tuscumbia; 
could not get through and returned to Waynesboro; left 
there yesterday at 2 o'clock. 
Forrest, with 2,000 to 2,500 cavalry and five pieces 
of artillery, left Columbia yesterday, crossed the 
Tennessee at Clifton, or near there, Tuesday, Napin with 
from 2,000 to 3,000 and four pieces of artillery crossing 
at Carrolville Monday to join Forrest. They reported 
that they were to attack Jackson first and Bethel next, 
the intention being to stop supplies to our army. No 
infantry had left Shelbyville west, but there was a 
movement of all forces taking place north. Some said 
they were to go west, but this could not be ascertained. 
No infantry accompanied Forrest to Columbia .... l8 
This report is significant in that it could easily be checked. On 
the day it was sent, Forrest attacked the Ohio and Mobile Railroad near 
Jackson, Tennessee. Forrest completely tore up the road. It was never 
used again during the War. Grant was forced to re-route his supplies 
down the Mississippi River. Most of what happened had been reported by 
Dodge's spy. 19 
The report of "movements of all forces taking place north;" also 
is verified. Bragg, who was in that vicinity wrote to Pemberton on 
November 6, 1862: "Our forces in motion, which may create a division 
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[against Grant] in your favor. My cavalry in North Alabama ordered to 
observe the enemy and harass his rear."20 
The report that no infantry had gone with Forrest proved correct 
too. On November 21, 1862, General Br agg wrote to Pemberton that Forrest 
had not been able to take infantry with him because they could not cross 
the Tennessee River.21 
On December 7th, 21, and again on the 31st, Grant sent Dodge tele-
grams asking for more information on Bragg and Rosecrans.22 On December 
26 Dodge sent two reports. The first came from his spies "east of the 
Tennessee River." This report told of six hundred Mississippi cavalry 
at Waynesborough and Clifton, Tennessee. At Old Carrolville, General 
Forrest had stopped long enough to leave his trains and then had left 
with about 3,500 men. The last part of this report mentioned that 
Jefferson Davis and Joseph E. Johnston had been in Chattanooga. The 
second report told of Bragg's army being at Tullahoma, Tennessee, some 
sixty miles southeast of Rosecran's army. This spy had mentioned that 
Bragg's army was falling back to Chattanooga. Bragg's soldiers were 
foraging in three counties near the Tennessee River. 23 
The intelligence information Dodge turned in during De cember was 
fairly accurate. Yet valuable intelligence is not only accurate but also 
preventive. The report that Dodge sent General Sullivan was generally 
accurate. But was the report of value? The report was sent the day that 
General Forrest attacked! The amount of damage done suggest that Forrest 
caught the Federals unprepared. The information sent by Dodge lost its 
46 
value by not being sent far enough ahead of Forrest's attack to be of 
real value. 
Forrest's attack was not the only one launched in December. General 
Earl VanDorn's cavalry moved rapidly f rom Grenada, Mississippi on 
December 20th and captured Grant's supply depot at Holly Springs in 
northern Mississippi. Fifteen hundred Union soldiers were captured and 
one million and a half dollars worth of military supplies were destroyed. 
This attack caused Grant to withdraw north from Oxford, Mississippi, to 
La Grange, Tennessee.24 
The appearance of Confederate cavalry added a new dimension to 
Dodge's secret service operations. Not only did Dodge have to continue 
sending spies to watch for Confederate troop movements to Vicksburg and 
the rear of Grant's army but now he also had to pin down the location of 
Van Dorn, and other Confederate cavalry units. 
In order to combat the Confederate cavalry, Dodge combined some of 
his scout/spies25 with his own cavalry. Instead of posting these men 
along railroad routes, in cities, or in the enemy's armies, he had them 
move with his cavalry into enemy territory. A good example of this type 
of operation can be seen in the case of William Call ender. 
In the summer of 1863, Callender and George Noris were sent seventy-
five miles north of Corinth. Their assignment was to locate Colonel 
Newsome's cavalry. Newsome had been causing Union forces no e.nd of 
trouble by his raids along their lines. After travelling several miles, 
Callender ran into a "citizen named Moon." Callender, who at the time 
was wearing a Confeder ate uniform, told Moon that he was a scout for 
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Newsome and was trying to rejoin his command. Moon, being unaware of 
Callender's true identity, told Callender that Newsome's cavalry was just 
ahead in a ravine. 
After this brief conversation, Callender rode off, not in the 
direction of Newsome's cavalry, but in the direction of his own. It took 
Callender little time to reach them. The Union cavalry had remained just 
out of sight, during Callender's conversation with Moon. Soon, more than 
four hundred Union cavalry were on Colonel Newsome's trail. 26 
When Dodge's scout/spies went into enemy lines, they usually wore 
Confederate uniforms. There were other ways this type of spy masked his 
true identity. As Callender said; "I wore my hair long, according to 
the southern style, and my clothes also befitted that sunny clime. The 
broad pronunciation of the average Southren I adopted without difficulty; 
and in a very short time, by continued practice, I became in person, 
manner, and speech a citizen or citizen soldier of the Southern Confed-
eracy. "27 
Unlike the majority of Dodge's spies, Callender was not a southerner. 
He also did not remain in a specific location for any length of time as 
did most of Dodge's spies. The type of intelligence operation that 
Callender was involved in was adopted for the purpose of locating enemy 
cavalry, and ~uickly following the information up with Union cavalry 
operations. This type of operation was best employed against the ~uick 
Confederate cavalry. 
The month of January 1863, was relatively ~uiet for Dodge's intel-
ligence operations. The only information filed went to General Rosecrans. 
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On January 17, Dodge reported he had captured orders from Bragg the day 
before. Bragg's cavalry, scattered along the Tennessee River, was to go 
to Chattanooga, sixty miles southeast of Rosecran's front. Part of it 
was to join E. Kirby Smith's "train" whi ch had gone to Tuscaloosa two 
weeks before. No reports were filed from Dodge's spies in Mobile, 
Meridian, and Jackson, Mississippi.28 
In February 1863, things began to happen. Joseph E. Johnston put 
Van Darn's cavalry in motion. Bragg's army, on January 3rd, had with-
drawn from Murfreesboro and had retreated forty miles south to Tullahoma. 
VanDorn's job was to protect the left flank of Bragg's army as it 
retreated from Rosecrans's. 29 
Dodge's spies picked up Van Dorn's movements on February 3, 1863. 
This report was sent to General Rosecrans: 
Van Dorn is concentrating a force at Tupelo, Pontotoc, 
and Okolona of mounted men, whose destination is, I think 
Bragg from the fact that corn has been collected on the 
Okolona and Decatur road at several points ... one brigade has 
moved up that road. Southern newspapers of the 29th say 
that part of his force has already crossed the Tennessee; 
but I think not .... 30 
On February 4, a second report was sent. This one came from a spy 
from Okolona, Mississippi, some seventy-five miles due south of Dodge's 
lines. VanDorn was there with his cavalry force. Other units from his 
command were at Cotton Ridge and at Pontotoc. No forces of Van Dorn's 
had crossed the Tennessee River.31 
On February 10, a third report was filed. Van Dorn had two regi-
ments and a battery near the Tombigbee River at Cotton Gin Post in 
northern Alabama. VanDorn was crossing at Cotton Gin Post. Dodge's spy 
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had talked with several of Van Darn's men. From these conversations he 
learned that Van Dorn was going to Bragg by way of the Pikeville and 
Russellville road. Both roads were approximately fifty to sixty miles 
southeast of Corinth in Alabama. Dodge also reported that captured mail 
indicated Bragg would fall back to Huntsville or Bridgeport, Alabama, 
in the northeast corner of the state.32 
Dodge showed how he could put this information to use. On February 
12, he wrote General Rosecrans that his cavalry had caught up with 
Van Darn's advance, twelve miles south of Burleson in Franklin County, 
Alabama. Dodge's men had caught a "number of prisoners. " Van Dorn was 
still moving north, however, with twelve pieces of artillery and four 
brigades of mounted men under W. H. Jackson, R. McCulloch, J. W. Whit-
field, and P. E. Armstrong. The prisoners taken by Dodge's cavalry were 
not aware where Van Dorn intended to go. Generals Roddey and J. B. 
Biffle, two independent Confederate cavalry c.ommands, had crossed the 
Tennessee River and were collecting forces in Tennessee.33 
In his report of February 12th, Dodge suggested that a gunboat be 
sent to Florence, Alabama, near the Tennessee River. Dodge predicted 
that this would be where Van Dorn would cross into Tennessee. His 
superiors should have taken his request more seriously. On February 14, 
General Hurlbut wrote the following: "Van Dorn was crossing at Florence 
yesterday. Push your movement rapidly as consistent, and report by 
telegraph when they move."34 
On February 16, Dodge informed Rosecrans that he had engaged Van 
Dorn and had taken some fifty prisoners. Also, Dodge reported that 
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fifty deserters from Bragg's army had told him that Bragg would soon 
retreat to Bridgeport, Alabama. Bragg had brought an engine from 
Decatur and was to run it on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Bragg 
intended to load train cars full of corn f or his army. One of Dodge's 
men who escaped from Van Dorn, told Dodge that Van Dorn could not stay 
and fight. His orders were to report to General Bragg immediately.35 
On February 22, 1863, Dodge sent his sixth report. In this one, 
he reported that Generals Van Dorn, Wheeler, Forrest, and Roddey were 
at Columbia, Tennessee fifty miles southwest of Rosecrans. The force 
Van Dorn crossed at the Tennessee River amounted to nearly 6,000 men, 
and could easily threaten Rosecrans's advance on Bragg's army. Part of 
his cavalry had crossed above Muscle Shoals.36 
The month of February, 1863, showed great improvement in Dodge's 
intelligence operations. In December 1862, both Forrest and Van Dorn 
had been able to strike Union lines effectively. In February Dodge's 
spies were able to keep closer tabs on Confederate cavalry. More 
importantly, their reports arrived in time to prevent the Confederates 
from completely surprising the Union army. 
Dodge's intelligence work was accurate in December 1862. The same 
was true in February 1863. For instance, in his report of February 22, 
Dodge estimated Van Dorn's force at about 6,000 and that this force was 
headed for Columbia, Tennessee. This information is verified by Joseph 
E. Johnston: 
... Lieutenant-General Pemberton had some six thousand 
cavalry near Grenada, unemployed, and almost unorganized. 
Under the circumstances described, Major-General Van Dorn 
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was directed to form a division of two-thirds of these troops, 
and move into Tennessee .... When there he was either to assist 
General Bragg ... or cover the country near Columbia, upon 
which [Bragg's] army depended for food.37 
The reports of February 1863, were not t otally concerned with Bragg 
and Van Darn. On February 23, Dodge sent General Grant information about 
events that had occurred .in Vicksburg to that date. The report sent 
Grant came from Dodge's spies posted at Mobile, Meridian, and Jackson, 
Mississippi: 
No troops have come to Pemberton's army since Smith's 
joined him about Christmas. All troops from Mobile up the 
road, and from Grenada, have gone to Vicksburg and Fort 
Hudson, leaving a few thousand at Mobile, some 600 at 
Meridian, and two regiments at Jackson, and about three 
militia regiments at Grenada. A portion that left Grenada 
all posted on Black River .... Everything in the shape of 
government property has been taken away from the country 
bordering the Yazoo and adjacent streams, and all prominent 
points, such as Jackson, Grenada, Columbus, etc. At Jackson 
the foundaries are running and a cotton mill or two ... but 
every preparation is being made to take them away. 
Mississippi is being entirely stripped of stock, provisions, 
forage, etc. and everything indicated they are getting 
ready for a quick move . 
... the great stock of cars and engines at Meridian, 
are being taken east and south .... 
The trains go loaded from Vicksburg daily with sick 
and discharged soldiers. They say that they average 12 
cars a day. Last week two heavy steamboat engines and 
the prow to a ram boat went up the road to Jackson; said 
to be placed in some boat on the Yazoo. 
Deserters and conscripts are flocking into my lines 
daily, and so far as the above statements are concerned, 
they corroborate them ... I still have men in Meridian, 
Columbus, Mobile, and Jackson, while one h~s gone on to 
Vicksburg, and will try to get to you .... 3 
In November 1862, Pemberton's force totaled 30,000 men. By the 
first part of January, 1863, President Davis had sent 9,000 more troops 
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from Bragg's army in Tennessee to Pemberton's at Vicksburg. Grant's 
army was about equal to Johnston's. By March of 1863, Grant was anxious 
to receive intelligence reports. Since Pemberton's force was equal to 
his, he could not afford to dispatch part of his own army to fight 
Confederates in his rear. He might not be able to take Vicksburg 
either if Pemberton received too many reinforcements.39 
Before Grant made his move to the rear of Vicksburg, he sent a 
telegram to Dodge asking him to "send a spy to Meridian," Mississippi. 
Meridian is one hundred and seventy-five miles east of Vicksburg. There 
had been several reports that large "numbers of cars and locomotives 
[were] concentrated there for the purpose of moving large bodies of 
troops over the [Southern Mississippi] Railroad."40 
The spy Dodge sent on this mission was E. D. Coe. After his return 
Coe wrote his brother James about his trip into "Dixie." On February 20, 
Coe had received orders to report at Corinth. After arriving Dodge told 
Coe to "fix [his] story" and be ready to leave Corinth by March lst.41 
The only incriminating evidence Coe kept on him after leaving Union 
lines as a "little map of the two states of Mississippi and Alabama," 
only five inches long and three inches wide. After reachi ng his destin-
ation, Coe decided to wait for the Confederates to find him. He went to 
a nearby farm and told the owner that he was a Yankee deserter who wanted 
to be paroled by the Confederates. He also told them that he "wanted 
to go to Georgia to live wit h [his] uncle." 
A Confederate cavalry unit came to the farm and questioned him. 
They also searched him but only found "two letters directed to Bragg's 
army." More than likely Dodge had given them to Coe. Coe explained 
that he had gotten these letters near his home of Bethal, Tennessee, 
however. A friend had a son in Bragg's army and Coe had volunteered 
to deliver them. 
Coe remained in the custody of these Confederates for two days. He 
was then paroled. He bought a horse and before leaving, convinced the 
captain of the Confederate cavalry to write him a letter of recommenda-
tion. On the . day of March 18, Coe reached Meridian where the railroad 
running from Vicksburg east crossed the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Dodge 
had told him to stay until May l, unless he found what Dodge wanted before 
then. Coe left Meridian on March 22, 1863. 
Coe proceeded east from Meridian and then north on his return to 
Union lines, in order to avoid the cavalry which had paroled him. At 
Tuscumbia, Tennessee, Coe ran into trouble. He was arrested and charged 
as a spy. He was questioned and searched. The Confederates found 
$300.00 in Confederate currency and $120.00 in gold. Dodge had given 
Coe the gold in order to bribe any Confederates who might detain him. 
Coe did not have to wait long for his trial. Luckily, Dr. Owens, 
the owner of the farm where Coe had stayed on his first night in the 
Confederate territory, was near Tuscumbia. Coe talked Owens into vouch-
ing for his loyalty. Owens had little suspicion of Coe and he was soon 
released. 
It was still dangerous f or Coe to go directly to Dodge's head-
quarters so he stayed at Owens's farm for several days. While there, he 
met a Mrs. Martin and her five year old daughter. Mrs. Martin's husband 
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had been forced to leave the south because of his outspoken loyalty to 
the Union. Mrs. Martin told Coe that she wanted to join her husband in 
the north. Eventually Coe, Mrs. Martin, and her daughter made their 
escape during the night. 
Coe was arrested by Dodge's pickets when he returned and was taken 
to Dodge's headquarters. Here Coe made his report. The Confederates 
had no intention of using the railroad cars at Meridian to move an army 
to Vicksburg. Dodge sent Coe's report on to Grant as soon as possible.42 
Coe was not the only spy active during March. On March 14, Dodge 
sent information to Major-General C. S. Hamilton. One of Dodge's spies 
had returned from a four week mission in Jackson, Mississippi. In his 
report Dodge stated that all Confederate troops at Jackson were moving 
west towards Vicksburg. Another division had left Grenada. Its destin-
ation was also Vicksburg. This same spy had gotten to within fifteen 
miles of Vicksburg but could not report on fortifications in that area.43 
On March 30, Dodge sent a report to General Hurlbut. General 
S. A. M. Wood's headquarters were at Florence, Alabama, fifty miles east 
of Dodge's lines. Wood had 4,000 men. Colonel C. R. Barteau had a 
brigade of cavalry south of Dodge at Verona. T. W. Ham a~d W. C. 
Faulkner were immediately west of Barteau. N. N. Cox, General Roddey, 
and a small detachment of Van Dorq's cavalry were in several northern 
Mississippi counties, close to Dodge's lines at Corinth.44 
The reports of March 14 and 30 were of some significance. The 
report of March 14 indicated that the Confederates were already concen-
trating in and around Vicksburg. Grant knew where his enemy was and 
where to concentrate his own forces. The r eport of March 30 was also 
important in that it indicated Confederate forces were i n northern 
Mississippi. This placed them in a str ategic position south of Dodge's 
lines at Corinth, and in the rear of Grant's army. From northern 
Mississippi these Confederates could threaten Grant's supply lines on 
the Mississippi River and harass his rear. Dodge continued to watch 
these forces. They never moved on Grant's rear or the Mississippi 
River, however. 
On March 30, 1863, General Hurlbut submitted his monthly report 
to General Halleck. In it he said, "General Dodge deserves great credit 
for his vigilance and activity." Still, the intelligence units had to 
keep a vigilant eye on Confederate activity in and around Vicksburg. 
Dodge could not let down. A quick move from the East could easily 
destroy Grant's entire campaign. 
The month of April began with news of enemy activity to the East. 
On April l, Dodge sent General Rosecrans word that bridges were being 
rebuilt "from Savannah, Tennessee, east and from Florence, [Alabama] 
north."45 On the 4th, Dodge wrote to Hurlbut giving him information on 
Confederate activity around Vicksburg.46 
On April 8, Dodge sent Hurlbut another report. Four spies had 
returned. Each reported considerable Confederate troop buildups in 
eleven northern Mississippi counties . Generals W. M. Inge and J. R. 
Chalmers had twelve thousand men, 8,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, near 
Bear Creek, Fulton, Ripley, Pontotoc, and Verona in Mississippi. 
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Additional Confederate forces were blocking all roads south of Grand 
Junction, Tennessee.47 
Dodge sent three more reports on the 9th and two on the 13th. 
Then, on April 14, 1863, Dodge sent General R. J. Oglesby the following: 
Captain [George E.] Spencer, my assistant adjutant-
general, has just returned from Tuscumbia; succeeded in 
getting through all the enemy's camps and obtaining 
valuable information. The forces are posted as follows: 
Colonel Dibrell, 900 men at Tuscumbia Landing; Colonel 
[Josiah] Patterson, 1,000 at Florence; Colonel M. W. 
Hannon, 1,800 at Tuscumbia; Colonel Roddey's old 
regiment, 800 at Tuscumbia Landing; Baxter Smith, 350, 
10 miles this side; Colonel Hampton, 300 at same place; 
[W. R.] Julian, 300 at Grey's, 6 miles this side, and 
Smith, 100 at Big Bear. The above all cavalry. Between 
Courtland and Tuscumbia, one brigade of infantry, under 
Colonel Wood .... This more than doubles their force. They 
have also five piecep of artillery at Florence and six 
pieces at Tuscumbia.48 
The information Dodge received from his spies in late March and 
early April indicated a large buildup of Confederate troops in north-
western Alabama. The location of these Confederates threatened the 
Vicksburg Campaign. The Confederates in northwestern Alabama could 
shield the Confederate flank if Generals Bragg or Johnston went to the 
aid of Pemberton at Vicksburg. 
Dodge's spies had given him information on the locations and numbers 
of Confederat~ forces in northwestern Alabama. Dodge used this informa-
tion to launch a successful attack which destroyed the Confederate supply 
lines to these troops. On his raid Dodge hit Bear Creek, Little Bear, 
Leighton, and Town Creek. He destroyed 1,500,000 bushels of corn, 
500,000 pounds of bacon, and burned several tanneries and cotton mills. 
Before returning to Corinth Dodge also destroyed the railroad between 
58 
Tuscumbia and Decatur. His raid forced the Confederates to pull back 
to the east; exactly where Grant and Dodge wanted them. Dodge filed an 
official report of his actions on April 25. In ending it, he put the 
following: "It is said ... that Johnston says he cannot send any more 
reinforcements. I think the entire force ahead does not exceed 5,000 
men."49 
The month of May, 1863, saw Dodge's intelligence operation reach 
its pinnacle. In that month Grant sent Sherman toward Jackson, 
Mississippi, to force Joseph E. Johnston away from his rear. Several 
days later, Grant's army fought the decisive battle of the Vicksburg 
Campaign - Champion Hill. After his successes in the Champion Hill and 
Jackson engagements, Grant forced Pemberton into Vicksburg and began 
the siege of the city. Pemberton surrendered, but not until July 4, 
1863. 
On May l, 1863, General Pemberton had surprised both Joseph 
Johnston and the Confederate War Department when he informed them of 
Grant's close proximity to Vicksburg. On May 9, a telegram from the 
War Department reached Johnston at Tullahoma, Tennessee. It directed 
Johnston to: "proceed at once to Mississippi and take command of the 
forces there, giving to those in the field, as far as practicable, the 
encouragement and benefit of your personal direction." Johnston took 
three thousand men from Bragg's army with him. After Bragg's arrival 
in Mississippi, Secretary of War John Seddon promised more reinforcements 
from General Beauregard in South Carolina and Georgia. Others would be 
sent as soon as possible.50 
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Johnston's move put Grant in a predicament. On his right, at 
Jackson, Johnston controlled all railroads in the area. By using these, 
Johnston could bring in men and supplies from the east to his army. 
Pemberton, on his left, could now escape f rom Vicksburg if Grant were 
to weaken his army by dispatching part of it to stop Johnston's advance. 
Grant, therefore, decided to send Sherman against Johnston at Jackson. 
This is where Dodge claims his spies' information proved of greatest 
value in the Vicksburg Campaign. 
Southern newspapers had reported the forces of Johnston and 
Pemberton at 60,000. The report of Dodge's spies estimated their total 
at 25,000 to 30,000.51 Dodge was more correct. With the reports from 
his spies: 
General Grant called first upon General Scholfield in 
the Department of the Missouri, to send his spare forces to 
him so that he would not have to detach from his army in 
front of Vicksburg to meet this force of Johnston and as 
General Grant [said] in his memoirs, he gave the command of 
this force located near Black River Bayou to General Sherman 
and as fast as General Johnston concentrated his forces, 
General Grant also received reinforcements .... 52 
On May 14, 1863, Sherman reached Jackson. By midmorning, Johnston 
and his men had retreated northward. Meanwhile, General McClernand, 
marched his corps to the Southern Mississippi Railroad, between Vicksburg 
and Jackson. Once Johnston had been forced back, Grant turned his 
attention on Pemberton and Vicksburg. 
Grant marched towards Champion Hill, Mississippi. Earlier, Johnston 
had requested that Pemberton march his army from Vicksburg and Edward's 
Station east so that he could join Johnston and jointly fight Grant's 
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army. Pemberton was a day late in doing this. As Grant's forces 
marched west they met Pemberton's going east.53 One of Dodge's spies, 
who had infiltrated Johnston's army, reached Grant just prior to the 
Battle of Champion Hill. Grant received information on the position of 
Johnston's forces and the number of men he had with him. This spy's 
name was Sanborn, and Dodge wrote later: "he [Sanborn] never came back 
to me. We never knew what became of him. "54 
Through May, Dodge posted spies as far east as Selma and Montgomery 
to watch for troop buildups in Johnston's army. On May 21 Dodge wrote 
the following: 
Tuesday and Wednesday, five brigades passed through 
Chattanooga on their way south to join Johnston, also two 
brigades of Texans said to be going to Rome, Georgia .... The 
troops were four days passing through Chattanooga ... I saw two 
more brigades ... two trains of empty cars going towards 
Tullahoma."55 
On May 31 Dodge wrote that Johnston was to get 10,000 troops up to 
the 16th of May from Savannah, Carolina, and Mobile. One division went 
to Johnston from Selma on the 23rd and one division went from Bragg in 
Tennessee. This brought Johnston's total to approximately 20,00o.56 
Not all of Dodge's reports dealt solely with troop strengths and 
movements. The following was part of an intelligence report sent by 
Dodge on May 21. It indicates the feelings that Pemberton's leadership 
aroused. "It is said that Johnston had taken large numbers of prisoners; 
that Pemberton was traitor, and had sent a bouquet to Grant, so arranged 
as to give position of rebel troops .... "57 
The last report in May gave Johnston's troop strength report: 
" ... Johnston has not received more than 8,000 and ... his command on the 
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25th was not to exceed 20,000 including [General] Loring. He is of the 
opinion that Breckinridge has joined him."58 
By June 14 Johnston sent the following urgent message to Pemberton: 
All that we can attempt t o do is to save you and your 
garrison. To do t his, exact cooperation is indispensible. By 
fighting the enemy simultaneously at the same point of his 
line, you may be extricated. Our joint forces cannot raise 
the siege of Vicksburg .... 59 
Johnston never received the "exact cooperation" he had asked for. 
On July l Johnston was between Brownsville and the Big Black River just 
east of Vicksburg. He wrote Pemberton from there that his army would 
create a diversion so that Pemberton and his garrison could escape. 
Johnston's planned action was to begin on July 7. As Grant wrote later: 
"Pemberton was made prisoner before this message reached him ... the fate 
of the Confederacy was sealed when Vicksburg fell." Dodge received word 
of the fall of Vicksburg on July 13.60 
The Vicksburg Campaign had lasted nine months. Dodge's intelligence 
operations played an important part from start to finish. Throughout 
the campaign, the information Dodge sent was quite accurate. The one 
problem that did develop was the delivery of intelligence information far 
enough in advance to be useful. This was overcome as the Vicksburg 
Campaign progressed. Dodge sent more frequent r eports between Confederate 
movements so that from one day to the next Grant was aware of Confederate 
actions to the east. 
Confederate cavalry units posed a special problem for Dodge's 
intelligence operations. The majority of Dodge's spies were trained to 
watch for troop concentrations, fortifications, and movements which 
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required that they be stationed in cities or railroad centers over long 
periods of time. Confederate cavalry were quick and mobile. Dodge's 
stationary spies could not effectively observe cavalry units unless they 
happened to stop in cities for long peri ods of time. In order to over-
come this problem Dodge sent out scout/spies. These men worked with 
Dodge's cavalry units in the field. A scout/spy would be sent a short 
distance in advance of the cavalry. When he discovered the location of 
Confederate cavalry units he would hurry back with the information. The 
cavalry would act upon this information immediately. 
By his own estimate, Dodge felt that the greatest service his spies 
performed was in sending Grant information on Joseph E. Johnston's troop 
strength and location in the latter part of May and in June. As Dodge 
said, "I was almost in constant communication with General Grant about 
Johnston's forces."61 This information proved useful and enabled Grant 
to dispatch reinforcements from other Union armies so that his own could 
capture Vicksburg. 
Vicksburg was not to be the final test of Dodge's intelligence 
operations. The next came in the Battle of Atlanta. Grant had planned 
to turn on Johnston's army as soon as Vicksburg fell. He had told 
General Sherman to be ready to drive Johnston out of Mississippi and 
destroy his army if he could. Dodge was to be a part of these plans . 62 
On July 7, only three days after Vicksburg fell, Dodge was promoted 
to the command of the left wing of the 16th Army Corps at Corinth.63 
Between July and August, 1863, Dodge continued to watch the Confederate 
forces on his left. Grant wanted to fight the Confederates where ever 
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he found them. Dodge's spies continued to help locate them. On July 17, 
he wrote General Hurlbut that one of his spies from Decatur, Alabama, 
and one from Jacksonville had observed Bragg's Army moving in three 
columns toward Atlanta by Railroad and land . Rosecrans's army had moved 
against Bragg and his force had advanced as far as Rome, Georgia. He 
concluded by telling Hurlbut that it looked as if Johnston and Bragg 
were to unite.64 
On July 22, a spy from Okolona reported that Johnston's army had 
fallen back to the Chunky River, (Ala.). General Bragg had fallen back, 
too, and was currently at Chattanooga and Atlanta. No forces from Bragg 
had joined Johnston.65 
On August 3, 1863, Dodge sent Hurlbut the following: "Forrest, 
with about 800 men, was at Jacks's Creek day before yesterday, and moved 
toward Tennessee River to cross at Yellow Bluff ... Yellow Bluff is about 
60 miles from here .... " This was the final report Dodge made before he 
left on furlough. It was not until October that he would return for 
duty. 66 
During Dodge's absence the Battle of Chickamauga Creek took place. 
On September 19-20, 1863, General Braxton Bragg moved his army from 
Ringgold, Alabama, north to Chickamauga Creek . Southeast of Chattanooga 
he and General Rosecrans, who was moving south, soon collided. By the 
afternoon of the 19th both armies were engaged along a three mile front. 
General Longstreet, who had joined Bragg's army after arriving by rail 
from the Army of Northern Virginia, cut through the Union line on the 
20th and forced Rosecrans to retreat toward Chattanooga.67 
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In late October, Grant made plans to free Rosecrans who had been 
"trapped" in Chattanooga. Sherman was ordered to take Dodge's corps 
up the Tennessee Valley and free the Union forces there. Dodge was, 
of course, very eager to participate i n thi s expedition, but he was soon 
disappointed. On November 5, 1863, Grant sent word that Dodge was to 
remain at Pulaski, Tennessee, while Sherman went on ahead to 
Chattanooga.68 
Dodge's army stayed at Pulaski until May 5, 1864, when General 
James B. McPherson, commander of the Army of the Tennessee ordered him 
to move to Chattanooga . Dodge soon found out why. Following the Union 
victory at Chattanooga, secret orders were sent to all the Northern 
commanders in Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi. 
Every command post which could afford to was to send east a few of its 
best men at night and by rail. Their destination was Georgia.69 
Sherman's campaign into Georgia began on May 4, 1864.70 Dodge, 
of course, did not wait until the campaign opened to send spies in its 
direction. In fact, he began recruiting new ones as early as October. 
He sent the following to one of his division commanders on the 25th of 
October: 
I desire you to use every exertion t o obtain information 
and to keep thoroughly posted of all movements of the enemy 
[s]outh of you, especially in the direction of Grenada [Miss.]. 
Employ citizens when you can find them living in that vicinity, 
also good men who will go out. I have always found that a 
reliable way was to employ citizens living in the county who 
would report when any movement of importance was made. Instruct 
your men along the line to use every exertion in this way. I 
will pay liberally for all valuable information, and also will 
pay well, good scouts or spies ... Our safety while we are so 
strung out, depends upon our receiving at all times the positions, 
strength, movements .... 71 
At about the same time that this message was sent, Dodge also sent 
a circular to his provost marshals: 
For the purpose of obtaining a thorough knowledge of 
the enemy in our front, you will always examine closely all 
citizens, refugees, deserters, and prisoners coming from the 
enemy's lines, and forward through your immediate commander 
direct to these headquarters, statements that may be of 
advantage, and such statements [that] relate to immediate 
movements of the enemy ... commanders will see that close 
attention is paid to this circular.72 
This recruitment activity in late October, 1963, did not mean that 
Dodge had no spies in enemy territory at this time. Several of his spies 
were already concentrating their attention in Alabama and Georgia in 
October.73 That month was relatively quiet however. This only incident 
of note occurred on October 19, when three of Dodge's scouts entered 
Pikeville, Alabama, arrested the county sheriff and took his jail keys. 
They then released seventy-three Union prisoners.74 
Dodge received reports from his spies through the months of November 
and December. Not until January 1864, did he begin to receive steady 
reports from Georgia, however. On January 6th Dodge sent word to 
Sherman that one spy had returned from Dalton, Georgia. There he had 
observed Johnston's army which the spy estimated "not to exceed 25,000 
effective men." One brigade of General Martin's cavalry was at Cave 
Springs, the state militia was at Rome, Coosaville, and Gadsden , in 
northwestern Georgia. All the stores and hospitals were moved south 
towards Atlanta. Wheeler's and Wharton's cavalry were ordered out of 
east Tennessee and General Roddey was guarding the north bank of the 
Tennessee River from the Flint River to Bear Creek in northern Alabama.75 
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On the 22nd Dodge's spy reported from Decatur, Alabama, and Rome 
and Summerville, Georgia. At Rome he observed the 4th, 8th, and llth 
Texas Cavalry and the 7th Georgia Cavalry. General Biffle's cavalry was 
there also. The Confederates were transporting corn on the Coosa River 
in Alabama and General Clanton's cavalry had connected with General 
Roddey's at Courtland and Summerville. General S. D. Lee was between 
Russellville and Vincent's Crossroads in northwestern Alabama.76 
On January 30, 1864, Dodge received a report from Atlanta. Two of 
his spies, one from Montgomery, Alabama, and the other from Atlanta gave 
the following report: " ... no troops left Johnston, but all commands 
southward have been moved to Mobile, as well as troops from Charleston 
and North Carolina. n77 
Dodge evidently felt this last report was important. On the follow-
ing day he wrote his assistant adjutant-general, George Spencer: "Find 
out all you can about Johnston's army, whether it is at Dalton, [Georgia]. 
Talk to the [Confederate] officer just as though you knew it [Johnston's 
army] had all gone from there. There evidently are large moves on the 
board by the rebels, and that is one of them. "78 
January, 1864 was the first month in which Dodge ;s spies concentrated 
in and around Atlanta. From then on, the Alabama/Georgia area was the 
center of Dodge's intelligence operations. In the Vicksburg Campaign 
Dodge was assigned the task of watching Confederate troop movements from 
east to west. In the Atlanta Campaign his assignment was reversed: he 
now had to watch for troop movements from west to east. 
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On February 14 one of Dodge's spies returned from Montgomery, 
Alabama . This spy reported seeing four regiments passing through that 
city going northeast toward Decatur. A division and a brigade had passed 
the same way a month before. The troops t hat made up these movements 
came from four depleted divisions. In the last sentence, the spy mentioned 
that conscription in Alabama was "raising many men. "79 
On February 26 Dodge received information from Atlanta, and he sent 
the following on to General Grant: 
The fortifications around Atlanta are simply 3 lines of 
rifle pits, surrounding the place; and on the Chattahochie 
River; ll miles north of Atlanta, commencing at the island, 
they are putting up works running down to the railroad bridge. 
These works have lately been commenced and every tenth negro 
has been impressed to work in them. 
Dodge also gave the location of fortifications and artillery in and 
around Rome, Georgia. This same report gave troop strengths and their 
locations. Atlanta had 5,000 troops, Rome 3,000, Gadsden, Georgia, 
boasted 2,500 under Roddey, and there were 1,500 in Oxford.80 
The report of the foritifications around Atlanta was of some import-
ance. The Confederate War Department had begun work on these fortifica-
tions as early as July, 1863. The work was not completed until April 
1864. The fortifications around Atlanta prior to the battle for that city 
(July 22, 1864) consisted of "20 strong redoubts" connected by rifle 
pits. Breastworks were covered with "abatis and Chevaux de frise -
stakes, the forerunner of the modern barbed-wire entanglements." Trenches 
had been dug in front of these, making it suicidal for a foe to attempt 
to storm the banks. Sherman undoubtedly used Dodge's report on February 
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26 in deciding not to storm the city but rather to lay a siege around 
"t 81 l • 
On February 25 Dodge sent Grant a report from a spy stationed at 
Montgomery, Alabama. In it Dodge told bot h Sherman and Grant that 
Confederate General Leonidus Polk's army had evacuated the Mobile and 
Ohio Railroad in central Mississippi and had retreated east to Mobile 
behind the Tombigbee River. The Confederates had left only a provost 
guard at Montgomery, Selma, and Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Joseph Johnston's 
army was still near Mobile.82 
This information proved correct. In his Meridian Campaign, Sherman 
forced Polk's army to retreat from Meridian, Mississippi on February 14. 
Fearing that after the fall of Vicksburg the Federals would launch an 
attack on Mobile, President Davis had advised General Johnston on 
January 14, 1864, to send troops there. Johnston approved of this plan. 
At the time of the spy's report, he was in that area.83 
Not until March 20, 1864, did Dodge send Sherman more intelligence 
information of much importance. On that day a spy had returned with 
information that only provost guards had been left at Gadsden and a single 
battalion at Summerville, Georgia. All other troops Were concentrated at 
Dalton.84 
On March 22 a spy reported that Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry was 
observed leaving Pikeville, Alabama, and on March 17, going west to 
Eastport, Tennessee. The cavalry planned to cross the Tennessee River 
above Eastport in the northwest corner of Tennessee and attack the Mobile 
and Ohio Railroad. Two cavalry units under Generals Roddey and Clanton 
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were then to attack Decatur, Alabama. Besides these cavalry reports the 
spy had seen the 21st, 27th, and 35th Alabama Infantry in Moulton. 
Dodge followed up this report and on March 23 reported that Forrest's 
crossing was feigned in order to draw his attention into Tennessee. 
Forrest had passed Corinth already.85 
On April 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, and 17, Dodge sent intelligence reports 
to his immediate commander, General George McPherson. These reports were 
concerned with enemy activity around Decatur, Whitesburg, and New Mount 
Hope, Alabama; Summerville, Gadsden, Triana, and Sulpher Springs, 
Georgia; and Hamburg, Tennessee. Filed just prior to the beginning of 
the Georgia Campaign, these reports show the geographical distribution 
of Dodge's spies during one month's activity. On April 13 Dodge reported 
Forrest's cavalry crossing the Tennessee River near Hamburg, Tennessee. 
On April 12 Dodge had reported no troops at Summerville, Georgia. The 
distance between these two points is approximately 150 miles.86 
In May 1864, the long awaited Atlanta Campaign began. The first 
battle of the campaign occurred on May 9-13 at Dalton, Georgia, approxi-
mately twenty-five miles southeast of Chattanooga. Dodge's spies had 
watched the buildup there as early as March 20, 1864. Johnston had con-
centrated a force of 43,000 men at Dalton in May. Sherman had 110,123. 
Sherman however, decided against a frontal attack on Johnston's army. 
Instead, he sent General McPherson on a flanking movement around Dalton. 
Dodge's army participated in th i s movement. Johnston held on to Dalton 
until the last minute and then while the huge Union army was bottled up 
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. at Snake Creek Pass he retreated south to Resaca and prevented Sherman 
from out-flanking him.87 
At Resaca fifteen miles south of Dalton , Sherman launched a frontal 
attack. This failed, however, so Sherman repeated what he had done at 
Dalton . McPherson's army was sent across the Oustanaula River in order 
to flank Johnston's army. Johnston began to withdraw, this time to 
Cassville and then to Allatoona Pass. Sherman, without even fighting 
kept his army going towards Atlanta, forty miles southeast of Resaca.88 
Johnston was not to be out-flanked, however. On May 25 he beat 
Sherman to a place called New Hope Church. When Sherman arrived, Johnston 
launched an attack. After it was over his men referred to it as the 
"Battle of the Hell Hole." After three days of fighting Sherman lost 
more than 3,000 men, Johnston around 900. Johnston again withdrew , this 
time to Kennesaw Mountain, only ten miles northwest of Atlanta . 89 
On July 3 , 1864, Sherman began his final drive on Atlanta. 90 On the 
night and early morning of July 9-10, Johnston drew part of his army 
across the "W and A" bridge and then burned it. Johnston then went 
toward Atlanta on the Marietta Road. By July 12, Sherman's army had 
repaired this bridge across the Chattahoochie. On July 14, Lorenzo 
Thomas's Army of the Cumberland crossed Powers Ferry. General Schofield's 
Army of the Ohio and General McPherson's Army of the Tennessee crossed 
the Chattahoochie, "poised for a well-planned mortal blow at 
Atlanta ... . "91 
At this point, one of Dodge's spies emerged from Atlanta , enabling 
Dodge to send the following report to General McPherson on July 18: 
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Scout in from Atlanta. He left there this morning, 
says the e.1emy were moving troops all night ... Bates division 
moved upon Peach Tree road and is entrenched on south side 
of that creek, near Howell's Bridge, that the bridge is 
ready to be burned ... one dismounted cavalry at Buck Head. 
This agrees with report of rebel lieut enant captured by me 
this morning .... 
On yesterday [General] Wood had the left, Polk the 
center, and [General] Hardee the right, the militia in 
Atlanta. Johnston has received no reinforcements up to today. 
The enemy are at work on their forts and entrenchments around 
Atlanta. 
Atlanta papers up to the 17th have nothing of interest 
in them .... 92 
On July 19 a second spy came out of Atlanta bringing the Atlanta 
Morning Paper. This paper had news of a change in Confederate command. 
General Joseph E. Johnston had been replaced by General John B. Hood. 
General Scholfield, of the Army of the Ohio had known Hood at West Point. 
Scholfield knew Hood's personality and predicted that Hood would launch 
an attack, which he did within 24 hours. The spy who made this report 
had joined a rebel regiment. Dodge in fact, had not seen him for six 
months. After making his report, Dodge sent him back to Nashville where 
he would be safe.93 
Dodge kept two spies in Atlanta during most of the campaign. These 
spies sent information almost daily to Dodge or George E. Spencer, Dodge's 
assistant adjutant-general. One spy had even infiltrated General 
Johnston's headquarters. On one occasion a spy gave Dodge the exact 
number of Confederate soldiers and the names of all division, brigade, 
and regimental commanders in Johnston's army.94 
The intelligence information gathered on the 18th was correct: the 
enemy was, indeed, moving troops all night. General Hood had shifted his 
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troops to the right of Sherman and on July 20 launched an attack against 
the position held by General Thomas. The attack was a failure, however. 
By July 21 General Sherman's army moved south to within two miles of 
Atlanta.95 
The intelligence reports of July 18 and 19 forewarned Union command-
ers of a Confederate attack. In this they were useful. Both reports 
were received well enough in advance to allow Union commanders to prepare 
for Hood's attack. On July 22, Dodge was ordered to send one brigade of 
Fuller's Division to the flank of McPherson's Army of the Tennessee. 
Soon afterward, Dodge was ordered to send Sweeney's Second Division to 
the left of the position held by General Blair. These turned out to be 
lucky moves. Hood had transferred General Hardee's corps and two divi-
sions of General Wheeler's cavalry to the rear of McPherson's army. When 
Hardee made his charge he was surprised to see Sweeney and Fuller fac.ing 
him. After a hard fought battle Dodge forced the Confederates back. 
During the battle, Dodge's corps captured eighteen flags, 5,000 arms, 
and 2,017 prisoners.96 The battle of July 22 is often referred to as the 
Battle of Atlanta even though the city did not fall until September. 
Dodge stayed in the field until August 19, 1864. On that day Dodge 
went out to inspect his lines. As he peered through a small hole in a 
bunker, a rebel sharpshooter fired a shot which seriously grazed Dodge's 
forehead. The wound was painful and sand had been thrown into his eyes. 
He was unconscious for two days. This injury ended Dodge's career with 
Sherman's army. After regaining consciousness he was sent north to 
Nashville and then home to Council Bluffs .97 He would return to military 
service, but not in the East. 
Both the Vicksburg Campaign and the Battle of Atlanta thoroughly 
tested the capability of Dodge 's intel ligence operations. During the 
Vicksburg Campaign, Dodge's spies and scouts were required to perform 
the double-service of delivering information on the movement of Confed-
erate armies from east to west, as well as to watch and report on 
Confederate cavalry movements which had seriously threatened Grant's 
entire campaign in its earlier phases. Dodge used his intelligence 
information to launch several cavalry operations against the Confederates. 
Grant learned from Dodge's information of the approach of Johnston's 
army from the East, of the position of Bragg's army in Tennessee, and 
of Confederate activity in and around Vicksburg. Most useful to Grant, 
however, were the troop strength reports on Johnston's army. With this 
information Grant was able to reinforce Sherman and prevent Johnston from 
saving Vicksburg. Dodge's intelligence reports undoubtedly made it 
possible for General Grant to capture Vicksburg sooner than he would have 
had he not received them. 
In the Atlanta Campaign Dodge was able to send Sherman and Grant 
continuous information of Confederate troop strengths, their movements, 
and fortifications. More than likely it was Dodge's report of extensive 
fortifications at Atlanta which caused Sherman to lay siege to the city 
rather than attempt a direct assault on it. Also, the news that Johnston 
had been replaced by Hood helped forewarn the Union army of Hood's likely 
attempt to break through Union lines and out of Atlanta. During the 
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Atlanta Campaign Dodge shifted most of his intelligence work from 
Mississippi to Alabama and Georgia. Not much else was changed in the 
operation . Dodge received information on Confederate troop movements 
from west to east. He also kept close watch on Confederate cavalry in 
his area. As Dodge moved near Atlanta, his spies were able to communicate 
with him daily. 
The information received from his spies was generally accurate. 
Most of the information was distributed sufficiently ahead of time to 
enable those who received it to take appropriate action. It would seem, 
then, that Dodge's intelligence operations were Quite valuable -not 
only to Dodge personally, but also to the overall success of the Vicksburg 
and Atlanta Campaigns. 
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CHAPTER III. 
MISSOURI, THE FINAL PHASE OF GENERAL 
DODGE'S INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 
It was not clear immediately that Dodge would end up in Missouri. 
After he was wounded, Dodge was sent north to Chattanooga and then to 
Nashville where his wife met him. They then went to their home in 
Council Bluffs. Dodge was not able to stay home long, however. General 
Grant wired him asking that he "visit" Grant's headquarters at City 
Point, Virginia.l 
Dodge arrived at Grant's headquarters on October 7, 1864. He 
stayed one week. During which time, Grant offered Dodge a command in 
the East. Dodge refused to take the offer, however, as he wished to be 
assigned to a command in the West or South. Grant then sent Dodge on to 
Washington to meet President Lincoln. After his meeting with Lincoln, 
Dodge received "vague orders" to report to General 0. 0. Howard, commander 
of the Army of the Tennessee, and he left for Nashville. 
Upon his arrival in Nashville, Dodge was ordered to take command 
at Vicksburg and to create a diversion for Sherman's army in Georgia by 
marching toward Montgomery or Mobile, Alabama. Dodge had hardly begun 
to do this when Secretary of War Edwin Stanton sent a telegram directing 
him to go to St. Louis, Missouri, and await further orders. 2 
On December 2, 1864, President Lincoln appointed Dodge Commander of 
the Department of Missouri, relieving General Rosecrans. On December 9, 
Dodge officially took command. So it was that Dodge who had begun his 
military career as a colonel in Missouri, would end it there as a major-
general and commander of the department.3 
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Dodge had a tough assignment in Missouri. The state had been run 
by nine northern generals, including Fremont, Schofield, Curtis, and 
Rosecrans. Each had failed to calm the disorder in Missouri. As with 
other border states, Missouri, was fragmented among unionists, secession-
ists, and the remaining portion of the population who only wanted to be 
left alone. This situation produced one of the bloodiest features of 
an already bloody war- guerrilla warfare.4 
Efforts of Union troops failed to suppress the guerrilla bands. 
Only with the surrender of the major Confederate armies would these 
irregular forces lay down their arms. Such men as "Bloody" Bill Anderson, 
Colonel William Clark Quantrill, Jesse James and Captain George Todd, 
carried on their warfare in Missouri with deadly effectiveness. Robert 
L. D. Davidson aptly characterized the situation in Missouri as: "Rocked 
by fratricidal and internecine strife, governed by a government in exile 
or one scarcely legitimate, belabored by intolerant military leaders 
or vacillation in policy from Washington .... "5 
Soon after taking command in Missouri, Dodge received several 
letters offering advice on how best to handle his new command. One 
person wrote: "Rule the rebels don't allow them to ru.le you." Senator 
John A. Kasson of Iowa even went so far as to write out a list of 
objectives: 
To pacify Missouri, suppress guerrillas, restore order ... by 
careful and persistarit work ... Rosecrans split on an easily avoided 
rock .... The policy for the Commander of Missouri is to head all 
parties talk ... Rosecrans loved pleasure and society, more than 
either.6 
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The first nroblem Dodge tackled was that of guerrillas and 
bushwhackers. He had only been in command for two days when he issued 
the following order: 
I desire to send out of Missouri and to their friends in 
the rebel army the families of noted bushwhackers and robbers; 
also the prominent families of persons now serving in the 
rebel army ... I believe this will have a salutary effect upon 
the State and will keep south many desperate men .... These 
families are almost invariably the rendezvous of spies and 
guerrilla bands ... respectfully request that you will designate 
some point on the Mississippi, Red, Arkansas Rivers where 
they can be landed and sent through the lines. Lists have 
already been prepared by district commanders, and as soon as 
the point is ascertained, they will be sent off quietly.7 
One writer has contended that Dodge's secret service had broken up 
following his wound at the Battle of Atlanta.8 Many of the spies and 
scouts used during the Vicksburg and Atlanta Campaign never saw service 
again. But Dodge did continue to use an intelligence organization. In 
order to combat the guerrilla bands, boat-burners, and other rebel 
organizations in Missouri, however, Dodge used the same general system. 
For instance, on December 19, 1864, Dodge wrote to the commanding officer 
at Springfield that he wanted scouts sent out to the extreme south-
western part of the state. There had been several reports that the rebels 
were planning a move in that area. Dodge concluded, "Send any information 
you may get."9 
Dodge apparently centralized his intelligence operations as much as 
possible. In Missouri, many of the intelligence reports concerning 
guerrilla bands went from the spy or scout to the district commander who 
was most directly affected by the information. Dodge, however, required 
that all intelligence information be submitted to his headquarters when 
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the district commanders filed their semi-monthly reports or, of course, 
immediately if the information warranted it. 
As part of his attempt to centralize hi s intelligence operations 
at his headquarters in St. Louis, Dodge kept complete lists of all 
families who were considered disloyal. Each district commander out of 
his district was required to send Dodge a list of disloyal persons in 
their district. These lists were classified in a specific order. The 
first list was made up of the names of families of noted bushwhackers, 
thieves, and robbers. The second list contained the names of persons 
who had voluntarily joined Sterling Price's army. The third list was 
made up of families with members in the Confederate armies. The fourth 
contained those persons who harbored bushwhackers and other rebel 
sympathizers, and the fifth contained the names of those who were 
generally sympathetic with the Confederacy. In addition, Dodge required 
that each of these lists show the age, number in the family, and an 
account of the real and personal property each possessed. These lists 
were used to send suspected persons across the lines but they undoubtedly 
assisted Dodge in running down guerrillas who constantly traversed the 
state. The lists helped Dodge figure out where guerrillas might hide. 10 
Dodge showed guerrillas little mercy. In one month he sentenced over 
thirty men to be hanged. On at least one occasion Dodge found himself in 
a particularly touchy situation because of this. 11 Dodge was not the 
only one who was rough with guerrillas. On December 29, 1864, one of 
Dodge's district commanders reported that a scout had reported from 
Saline and La Fayette Counties. While visiting there, the scout 
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discovered that Quantrill had passed through three weeks before. Before 
leaving, the scout questioned a man by the name of McReynolds. When 
McReynolds confessed to having fed and aided Quantrill, the scout pulled 
his gun and shot him.12 
From December through March, Dodge's spies, scouts, and cavalry were 
kept busy with the guerrilla war. Over one hundred engagements took 
place during these months in which Dodge's men either killed, captured, 
or wounded a total of one hundred rebels. 13 
Dodge received intelligence information from his district commanders 
on a semi-monthly basis. For instance, Colonel Catherwood, commander of 
the district of Rolla, Missouri, sent the following typical report on 
January 14, 1865: 
1. Camped on Dove Creek - attacked a band of guerrillas. 
Killed Eliga Hatman and wounded Andy Hatman. These men belonged 
to Thomas Yeates band. 
2. Camped on right fork of Big Piney 
Morris [guerrilla] killed; killed Richard 
Robert Stevens and routed Thomas Yeates. 
and killed [Doolan] and [Spoon]. 
[River] -William 
Douglas and James 
Continued pursuit 
3. Overtook band of Copeland's guerrillas on the 11th and 
killed [William and Wilburn Gilmore]. 
4. [On the] 12th - headed for Lichen and routed Copeland 
again on the Elk Creek. Supposed Copeland to be wounded. 
5. From information gained the following bands of 
guerrillas [are] around [Rolla]: Thomas Yeates with about 12 
men, John Maply with about 30, Captain Copeland with about 30, 
Richard Kitchen with about 15, and Colonel Freeman is said to 
be on Spring River with about 200 men. 14 
On January 18, the district commander of southwest Missouri, reported 
that two guerrilla leaders, by the names of McRae and Dobbs, were in the 
vicinity of Batesville and the northeast part of Arkansas. Seven 
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prisoners from Alf Cook's guerrilla band had been captured near Sugar 
Loaf Creek. Cook, Brown, and two other guerrillas had been killed by 
his cavalry. 15 
Brigadier-General Thomas Ewing, commander of the St. Louis district 
also filed a report. Scouts sent into Oregon County had killed seven 
guerrillas. From scouts and spies in northeast Arkansas, Ewing learned 
much about the concentration of troops in Arkansas: 
General McClary commanding in N. E. Arkansas issued an 
order about the 15th inst. ordering his command into camp at 
Jacksonport on the 25th of January, with [the] promise that 
they should be clothed and furloughed to go home and make a 
crop. General McClary has from 2 to 4 hundred men in Lost 
Bottom ... they are not in camp but scattered through the 
country at their homes. Colonel Tom Freeman of McClary's 
command ordered his men together ... 15 miles below Batesville ... 
Colonel Reeve is not trying to get his men together. Same with 
Austin Johnson. Major Berryman is in Oiltrough Bottom, below 
White River with 80 to 100 men. Captains Pratt, Bosi, Denis, 
Philips, Wever, and Williams have independent companies and 
roam throughout the S. E. counties of Missouri and northern 
counties in Arkansas .... Numerous squads of outlaws.l6 
The final report for January 1865, was submitted by Brigadier-
General John B. Sanborn Commander of the district of southwest Missouri. 
Sanborn's report was similar in content to those of Ewing and 
Catherwood's. The spies in Sanborn's district had wat~hed the Confeder-
ates north of the Arkansas River. In each of the following months, 
Dodge received intelligence reports from one end of the state to the 
other and also from northern Arkansas. 17 
The work done by Dodge's spies and scouts was so effective that on 
February l, 1865, Dodge was able to send a Colonel Morrell to Governor 
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Oglesby with a list of the names and locations of numerous bushwhackers 
living in Illinois. On February 5, Governor Oglesby wrote back: 
... with your letter in relation to bushwhackers in our 
state. I gave [Morrell] all the encouragement I could on the 
subject ... it will afford me all pleasm·e to aid you all I can 
in every effort you may make here to punish this class of 
outlaws. It may occur however that in the act of carrying them 
out of the state that loyal sympathizers may interfer with 
legal processes to arrest the officer having in charge the 
outlaw and thus detain them ... I cannot interfere to order a 
release - the forms of civil proceedings in a state prevents 
8 this by any Governor strong as my wish to do so ... this I know. 1 
Even though Dodge's intelligence operations were vast and his 
cavalry continually engaged rebel guerrillas, many citizens were still 
not happy with the general conditions in Missouri. In January, 1865, 
Dodge received a letter from Austin A. King, a member of the House of 
Representatives from Missouri. King told Dodge that he had been unhappy 
with the reports he had received from citizens of his district. Bush-
whackers still committed their atrocities, a squad of Dodge's soldiers 
had reportedly pulled a man from his house and had shot him on the spot, 
and robbery was a quite common occurrence. King ended by urging Dodge to 
launch an investigation and crack down on guerrillas. A similar letter 
was sent by Colonel H. R. Cummings of the 39th Iowa Infantry. Cummings 
threatened to "send [anyone] to heaven without waiting for the chaplain" 
if he caught any soldiers beating and robbing. 19 
Dodge took his strongest action in the latter part of January 1865, 
when he issued his General Order No. 7. This order required that all 
citizens report all encampments of bushwhackers. Those who failed to do 
so would lose their property and be banished from the state. Furthermore, 
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Dodge held disloyal residents in each county responsible for any injury 
done to Unionists in their area.20 
Lincoln felt Dodge's order was too harsh and criticized it in a 
letter to the governor of Missouri, Thomas C. Fletcher. Others liked 
'General Order No. 1.' James S. Thomas, mayor of St. Louis, wrote Dodge 
that if Dodge's order were carried out, "these fiends in human shape" 
would be gone in sixty days. Amos P. Foster, secretary of the Missouri 
state convention, sent a resolution to Dodge congratulating him and 
giving the full support of the convention. Dodge felt that his order 
worked, for he wrote later that guerrilla activities declined considerably 
after he issued it. 21 
On February 5, 1865, Dodge received command of the Department of 
Kansas. GeneralS. R. Curtis, who had been the previous commander, was 
sent to the Department of the Northwest. At the same time General John 
Pope was made commander of the Military Division of the Missouri. Dodge 
was to report to him. General Pope was "commander of the West" which 
encompassed several departments. However, it should not be thought that 
Dodge was superseded in Missouri. The Department of Kansas was simply 
merged with his own. 22 
When he assumed his command, Dodge inherited a difficult situation 
in Colorado. In November 1864, Colonel John M. Chivington of the Colorado 
militia had led an attack on an encampment of peaceful Cheyenne Indians 
at Sand Creek in eastern Colorado. In the carnage over 450 Indians died 
and the Cheyennes and Arapahoes rose up against the whites. By February, 
Dodge was preparing for an extensive campaign. 23 
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Before Dodge took over his duties in Kansas spies had been sent into 
the Indian territory. 24 The following report was submitted by Brigadier-
General Robert B. Mitchell on February 9: "I have sent three spies up to 
the Running Water in Dutch, Nebraska, one white man and two Omaha Indians 
with instructions not to return until they ascertain what Indians are 
there, their numbers, and what they are there for .... "25 
On the day Mitchell submitted his report, Dodge sent an intelligence 
report to General Pope concerning Indian activities. In it he told of 
indications that large parties were moving westward on the Republican 
River in Nebraska. In January they had crossed the south fork of the 
Platte River twenty-three miles west of Omaha. They had camped near 
there. There were four hundred lodges, containing eight warriors each -
"many lodges being thirty robes in size." These Indians possessed 
breech-loading carbines. They had gone northward past Fort Laramie. 26 
Dodge even sent a letter to Governor Crawford of Kansas asking that 
a "competent man" be sent to the Pottowatomie Indians. Dodge hoped that 
several of the Pottowatomie could be recruited to serve as scouts and 
guides on the plains. 27 
Dodge also had spies in the Indian territory on the western border 
of Arkansas and a portion of Missouri's southwest border. On February 14, 
1865, Dodge received the following report from Major-General J. G. Blunt: 
From Colonel Wattles, of the First Regiment Indian Home 
Guard, just arrived from Fort Gibson, I learn that the forces 
of Stand Waitte, Cooper, and Gans, together with a portion of 
the force that lately went south with General Price, numbering 
in all about 7,000 are at and in the vicinity of Boggy Depot, 
92 
Choctaw Nation. These forces are represented as being well 
mounted ... [word from] refugees lately arrived from Texas is 
that small expeditions are organizing in Bonham and Sherman, 
Texas for the purpose oB making a raid into the southwestern 
part of this state .... 2 
Dodge continued to keep spies among the Indians. Dodge wrote to 
General Mitchell at Omaha on February 17 ordering him to keep spies in 
northern Nebraska and also sending some Pawnees up "to find their 
camp. "29 In April 1865, Dodge wrote to General Blunt that Stand Wai tte, 
under order from Confederate officials, was to operate against Kansas . 
The fifteenth Kansas Cavalry and the third Wisconsin was left with Blunt 
in case of such an attack. Dodge ended his report suggesting that Blunt 
"put some good man after Stand Wai tte .... "3° 
The use of spies among the Indians seemed to work well. By 
employing friendly Indians, white men familiar with the territory, and 
half-breeds, Dodge was able to keep track of his enemy. As Stanley 
Hirshon states: "Unaccustomed to such operations, the Indians never 
suspected that army agents were among them. As in 1863 and 1864, Dodge 
supported these secret service activities with money procured from his 
quartermaster. "3l 
When General Pope took command of the Military District of Missouri 
he asked that Dodge send spies out to observe Confederate activity around 
the Red River area in Arkansas. Colonel Jeff Thompson known as "the Swamp 
Fox of the Confederacy" had been in the area; but most of Dodge's first 
report dealt with Generals Price, Magruder, Stand Waitte, and Gans. Dodge 
informed Pope that these generals were near Camden, Boggy Depot, 
Washington and other points in the Choctaw Nation. The troops there were 
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in good condition and it was said that they would launch an attack in the 
spring. The leading officers were generally dissatisfied with General 
Price's command in Missouri the year before. There were four regiments 
of rebel cavalry wintering in Crowlee 's Ridge , north of the Arkansas 
River. Dodge ended the report telling Pope that he still had spies in 
the Red River area who would return soon and give more information. Dodge 
followed this report with one on March 8, 1865. This one is even more 
detailed than the first.32 
Dodge's intelligence operations thus observed guerrilla activities 
in Missouri and Arkansas, arrested bushwhackers in Illinois, and spied on 
various Indian tribes in Kansas and Nebraska. 
An additional aspect of Dodge's intelligence operations in the west 
involved his counter intelligence force. Dodge's detectives operated 
much like his spies. His detectives often masked their identity and 
often went into rebel territory. However, Dodge's detectives were sent 
on missions to arrest individuals. His spies were sent on missions to 
observe Confederate troop locations and their movements. Throughout the 
war, Dodge had employed suchdetectives. For instance, George W. Green 
had been one of Dodge's detectives at Corinth, Mississ ippi, and W. F. 
Harrison served as one while Dodge was at Pulaski , Tennessee. 33 
Until January 1865, however, Dodge's detectives played only a minor 
part in his overall intelligence operations. In fact, Dodge's best known 
counter intelligence work t o that date was done not by detectives but by 
scouts. Back in November of 1863, while Dodge was at Pulaski, Tennessee, 
Confederate spies inf iltrated his lines. Captain Coleman, the chief of 
94 
scouts for Confederate General Braxton Bragg, disguised himself as a 
doctor and in this manner was able to come and go between the lines with-
t . . 34 ou susplclon. 
Not until January 1865, however, did counter intelligence really 
become a major part of Dodge's intelligence operations. There was a 
special need for such work in Missouri, where various conspiracies were 
constantly coming to light during Dodge's assignment. Much of the credit 
for uncovering these conspiracies must be given to Dodge's detectives and 
his provost marshal-general, J. H. Baker. 
Through his detectives and a postmaster at St. Louis, Dodge learned 
of plans to assassinate high ranking Union generals, but this knowledge 
did not save him from nearly being murdered. At dusk one day Dodge 
stepped out of the Lyndell Hotel and into an open carriage which was to 
drive him to his headquarters across town. On this particular day, 
Dodge scooted into the front seat along side the driver. As they rode 
down the street a shot rang out and the driver, a young black man, 
slumped against Dodge's shoulder, dead.35 
With the aid of his detectives, Dodge did manage to break up a 
smuggling ring. For quite some time, a group of people i n St. Louis had 
been able to carry on trade with the rebels even though the entire city 
was surrounded with Union troops. Dodge assigned several detectives to 
the case. They soon discovered the membership and methods of the ring. 
The smugglers operated a funeral parlor of sorts. They would place 
contraband goods inside a coffin and then would form a funeral procession 
to pass; indeed, they probably removed their hats in respect for the 
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deceased. The coffin was buried and the last rites read. At night the 
smugglers from outside the city would go to the grave, dig up the 
contents, and proceed into the rebel lines. Thi s smuggling was, of 
course, ended as soon as Dodge discovered it.36 
The most spectacular of all detective work involved the breaking up 
of a Confederate conspiracy to disrupt the Union supply lines on the 
Mississippi and its tributaries. An officer from the Union navy 
approached Dodge about the destruction of several steamboats "through 
bombs manufactured to look like cakes of coal." Dodge directed his 
provost marshal-general, Colonel J. H. Baker to put detectives on the 
case.37 
On March 29, 1865, Baker filed his first report. Baker had begun 
his operations in St. Louis but had gradually expanded them until they 
encompassed several other military departments. Most of his detectives 
were stationed in large river cities. Baker's detectives discovered the 
existence of an organized band of "boat burners." This group was directly 
f inanced by Confederate Secretary of War John Seddon, Secretary of State 
Judah P. Benjamin, and President Jefferson Davis.38 
By March several of these conspirators had been arrested and were 
awaiting trial in St. Louis. The evidence agains t these men showed that 
they 
were at Richmond and Mobile l ast s ummer; that they crossed the 
lines in Missouri within twenty-five miles of Memphis and sub-
sequently scattered in various directions; that they brought a 
large amount of gold from Richmond, which it was understood 
among themselves was to pay for the burning of certain 
Government propert y .... 39 
Baker went on to state that from the knowledge he had gained at 
this point he was confident he could arrest many of the "boat burners" 
in other departments. The only drawback was that in order to carry out 
this plan he would need more money. His base of operations had been 
extended as far north as St. Paul, Minnesota, as far south as New Orleans, 
and as far east as the Atlantic coast.4° This led to higher costs in 
his operations. Dodge in this same report enclosed a letter requesting 
$10,000. Edward Hoffman, one of the detectives used in this operation, 
wrote the following letter to Dodge complaining about the inadequate 
pay: 
I have the honor to state that I have learned that you 
deem $600 per month, for the service to be rendered in the 
c.ontemplated trip too great. Fermi t me to say General that I 
think you have not fully thought of the dangers, hardships, 
etc., consequent upon such a trip ... if you pay a poor price, 
you will only get poor men. You can get men for $200 per 
month, but will they benefit you? Suppose they are misled? ... 
My trip may save the Government millions of dollars and yet 
you hesitate about a few hundred dollars. 41 
On April 25, 1865, Baker submitted a second report. Baker had 
arrested a leader of the "boat burners" and had sent him to Gratiot Street 
Prison in St. Louis to await trial. Ten others had also been imprisoned. 
One of these men, under promise of immunity from prosecution, made a full 
confession. Meanwhile the leader of "boat burners" Edward Frazor, was 
charged and turned over to a military commission. There was a delay in 
Frazor's trial during which time he too made a full confession in order to 
avoid prosecution. The two confessions corroborated each other and so 
Baker forwarded his report with confidence.42 
97 
These confessions indicated that several men, including Frazor, 
had gone to Richmond in the summer of 1864. There they held an interview 
with the Secretary of War John Seddon and l ater with Secretary of State 
Judah P. Benjamin. Frazor showed a list of boats already destroyed. 
Secretary Benjamin offered $30,000 in greenbacks "to settle" with the 
"boat burners" but they refused. Benjamin next offered $35,000 in gold. 
This they accepted.43 
While Frazor was signing a receipt for the gold, President Davis 
walked into Benjamin 1 s office. Davis talked of sending men to Nashville 
to destroy a bridge. Davis asked Frazor several questions about the 
bridge and then offered Frazor $40,000 if he would do the job. Frazor 
agreed. Before the "boat burners" left Richmond, Benjamin gave Frazor 
a draft for $34,800 on Columbia, South Carolina, and Secretary Seddon 
furnished them with passes out of the rebel lines.44 
In the same report, Baker submitted a list of the principal men 
involved in this conspiracy. Judge Tucker was "chief of this service 
under the secretary of war." Tucker had formerly resided in Missouri and 
had published the State Journal and later was connected with the Missouri 
Republican. At the time of Baker's report Tucker lived in Mobile, 
Alabama. 45 
Next in rank to Tucker was Minor Majors. This man directed the 
boat-burning activities inside Union lines. John R. Barrett, a former 
Congressman from St. Louis, was in charge of "land operations." During 
the earlier phases of the war, Barrett had gone to Europe where he was 
suspected of collaborating with Confederate Ministers Mason and Slidell. 
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Baker had arrested Barrett in 1864 on the charge of being a member of a 
rebel organization, the Order of American Knights, but Barrett had been 
released for lack of evidence.46 
Robert Louden of St. Louis had been sentenced to death but had 
escaped while being transferred from Gratiot Prison in St. Louis to Alton 
Military Prison in Alton, Illinois. Louden was last seen by detectives 
in New Orleans. Another conspirator, William Murphy had voluntarily 
turned himself in, but had left St. Louis suddenly and had not been seen 
since. Isaac Elshire escaped from Gratiot Prison. Elshire was charged 
with the burning of the steamboat "Robert Campbell" in which several 
soldiers had lost their lives. Other names listed were s. B. Harwood, 
Harrison Fox, and Peter Mitchell all of St. Louis, Thomas L. Clark of 
Grenada, Mississippi, William Irwin of Louisville, Kentucy, and John G. 
Paris of Memphis, Tennessee. The list of principal conspirators was 
incomplete. Several others were still behind Confederate lines.47 
Baker followed the list of the principal conspirators with a list 
of the boats their organization had burned. The steamboat "City of 
Madison" was burned at Vicksburg in August, 1863. In the same month and 
year the steamboat "Champion" was burned in Memphis, Tennessee. The 
"Robert Campbell, Jr." was burned at Milliken's Bend, Mississippi on 
September 28, 1863. The "Imperial" was burned at St. Louis along with 
the "Hiawatha," "Post Boy," "Jesse K. Bell," "Chancellor," and "Forest 
Queen," in 186 3. Several wharf boats were burned at Cairo and Mound 
City, Illinois, and a small tow-boat in Memphis, Tennessee. In his 
conclusion, Baker emphasized that his list of ships burned, like his 
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list of principal conspirators, was incomplete. Since the start of the 
war, these and similar burnings totaled over sixty in the St. Louis 
area alone. 48 
After reading Baker's report both the inspector-general of the Army 
and A. A. Hosmer of the Bureau of Military Justice recommended that "all 
of the gang" be apprehended and tried together by a military commission 
for "treasonable conspiracy," Both departments concurred in Dodge's 
recommendation to send detectives to Richmond and Mobile and arrest the 
other "boat burners." The Bureau of Military Justice asked Dodge and 
Baker to send certified affidavits and other evidence to Washington "for 
the use or reference of the executive officers of the Government."49 
On April 25, 1865, Dodge issued his Special Order No. 109. This 
required that all boats on the Missouri River be taken over by military 
personnel. No citizen was to cross the river south of Leavenworth City 
without a military permit. Regular ferries and the North Missouri 
Railroad Company were the only exceptions. They could carry both freight 
and passengers. All other boat owners were to take their boats to a 
specific point on the river where they were to remain under military 
guard. 5° 
Because of the Confederacy's collapse, Dodge's Special Order No. 
109, was the last measure taken to stop the "boat burners." On April 9, 
Dodge received a telegram from Secretary of War Stanton informing him of 
the surrender of General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox. On April 29, 
Dodge offered Colonel Jeff Thompson the same terms as Grant had given Lee. 
On May 11, 1865, Thompson agreed to lay down arms at Wittsburg and 
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Jacksonport on May 25.51 After that the only noteworthy intelligence 
came on May 16, and 27. General Blunt reported that twenty guerrillas, 
formerly of Colonel Quantrill's party, had ridden through his district. 
On May 27, Dodge also received a report that E. Kirby Smith planned to 
continue his fight even if Thompson surrendered. Nothing came of either 
report.5 2 
Dodge ended his military career on June 1, 1865. One of the last 
of his reports, however, was sent on June 24, 1865. In it Dodge wrote 
General Pope that Confederate Jeff Thompson had surrendered and that all 
bands of bushwhackers in Missouri had surrendered at Lexington, Cassville, 
Fort Scott, and Bloomfield. In ending this report Dodge wrote: "I can 
report that peace and quiet reigns in Missouri."53 
In summary, it seems that Dodge's intelligence operations in 
Missouri were as varied as they had been during the Vicksburg and Atlanta 
Campaigns. In Missouri his spies, scouts, and detectives were put to 
work against rebel guerrillas in Missouri, Arkansas, and Illinois; against 
the Indians in revolt on the plains, and against several Confederate 
conspiracies, the largest being the "boat burners." 
In order to combat the guerrilla situation in Missouri Dodge required 
that each of his district commanders submit complete lists of disloyal 
families. The information from these was classified into the five cate-
gories described earlier. This practice enabled Dodge to centralize his 
intelligence operations at his headquarters in St. Louis. 
These lists, plus his district commander's semi-monthly intelligence 
reports kept Dodge up to date on guerrilla activity throughout the state. 
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It cannot be said, however, that this system, plus the use of his spies 
and scouts, overcame the guerrilla problem. It would seem that of 
greater significance in combating guerrillas was his Special Order No. 7. 
This required that any person knowing the location of guerrillas report 
them and that known rebel sympathizers were responsible for injuries 
committed on Unionists in their district. 
Following Chivington's Massacre on Sand Creek in Colorado, several 
Indian tribes rose in revolt. At about this time Dodge was given the 
responsibility for commanding the Department of Kansas. Dodge was also 
able to use spies against the Indians. They never suspected that Dodge 
had sent spies to observe them. Dodge was able to keep tabs on several 
Indian tribes in both the Indian Territory and the plains through the use 
of this method. This enabled Dodge to know their whereabouts and where 
they might attack. 
Though Dodge used detectives throughout the war, not until he took 
over the Department of Missouri did they assume much importance. The only 
other significant counterintelligence operation up to that point had been 
the arrest, trial, and execution of Sam Davis in November, 1863. Dodge's 
provost marshal-general used detectives to break up the "boat burners" 
conspiracy which was the largest counterintelligence operation Dodge 
encountered during the war. 
Dodge's intelligence organization came to a halt the day Dodge left 
the service. On June l, 1865, Dodge ordered all payments from his secret 
service funds stopped. However, this was not the last Dodge heard of his 
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secret service. Three years after he had left the Army, the auditors 
of the War Department asked Dodge to make an account of the exact sum 
he had spent for spies used in cooperat ion with Generals Grant and 
Sherman. Nineteen years later t he War Department wrote: "Your secret 
service accounts for the years 1863 to 1865, amounting to $17,099.95 have 
been examined and adjusted and are now closed on the books of this 
office. "54 
Immediately following the war Dodge accepted the position of chief 
engineer for the Union Pacific Railroad. After its completion in 1869, 
Dodge joined the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, again as chief 
engineer. Throughout the remainder of his life, Dodge was connected in 
some way with approximately nineteen railway companies. In 1901 the 
Des Moines Register estimated his fortune at $25,000,000. Dodge's time 
was not solely taken up with railroad matters, however. He was also a 
politician and an author of several books. Dodge finished his last book, 
Personal Recollections of President Abraham Lincoln, General Ulysses S. 
Grant, and General William T. Sherman, in 1915. He died a year later on 
January 3, 1916, and was buried at Council Bluffs.55 
Dodge received few letters from the men he used i n his intelligence 
operations following the war . George E. Spencer, a former spy, wrote 
Dodge several days before Dodge left the service, asking Dodge to write 
President Johnson and recommend Wi lliam H. Smith as military governor of 
Alabama. He also received several letters from Philip Henson. Other than 
these Dodge heard littl e of his secret service.56 
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CONCLUSION 
Grenville Dodge's intelligence work began as a direct result of 
the wartime conditions he encountered . Furthermore, the concept for such 
work did not originate with Dodge. When Dodge was ordered to Rolla, 
Missouri in 1861 his immediate superior, General John C. Fremont, ordered 
Dodge to check up on the numerous rumors of Confederate advances towards 
Union lines. At first, Dodge sent his cavalry to do this, but he soon 
found that all his cavalry horses were being worn out. At the suggestion 
of one of his subordinate officers, Colonel White, Dodge sent several 
spies into rebel territory. When Dodge found that these spies' reports 
were accurate he began to organize and expand his intelligence operations. 
Though the idea of using intelligence operations originated with 
Colonel White, General Dodge deserves credit for taking the idea and 
developing it into a working organization. Dodge's organization had four 
basic elements: systematic reporting, communication, secrecy and 
finance. The first of these was his system of reporting. Dodge soon 
encountered the problem of his spies tendency to overestimate enemy troop 
strengths. In order to overcome this problem Dodge taught his spies to 
recognize the difference between freight, passenger, and baggage train 
cars. His spies were taught the capacity of the cars. The spy simply 
counted the number of each type of car, multiplied the capacity and arrived 
at an accurate troop strength report. A second concept Dodge taught his 
spies was the amount of space a division, regiment, battalion, or brigade 
took up on a road. With these methods Dodge was able to receive accurate 
and uniform reports. 
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The second element in Dodge's intelligence organization was 
communication. Dodge developed a system of communication which lessened 
his spies' risks and maintained the secrecy of the organization. Dodge 
directed his men to stay within Confederate l ines as much as possible. 
Early in the war, Dodge organized the First Alabama Colored Cavalry and 
Infantry. The families of these soldiers continued to reside in 
Confederate territory throughout the war. Dodge instructed his spies to 
deliver their reports to one of these families. The family could then 
·take the report to Dodge's headquarters without arousing any suspicion. 
When Dodge became commander of the Department of Missouri, the system 
of communication changed. Whereas before, Dodge had received his spies' 
reports directly, in Missouri he had them funneled through his district 
commanders. More responsibility for the hiring of spies was given to 
his district commanders. Dodge had been a district commander when he 
first organized an intelligence operation. He probably felt that giving 
his district commanders more freedom in the area of intelligence work 
was the most practical policy. The district commanders were to report 
intelligence activities in their semi-monthly reports or immediately if 
the information warranted it. 
A third fundamental element in Dodge's intelligence organization 
had to do with secrecy. Obviously, his practice of having intelligence 
reports sent through the families of the First Alabama Cavalry and 
Infantry protected the secrecy of his organization. In addition, Dodge 
made it a policy never to write down his spies' names more than once. 
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Names were dropped and his spies were designated by letters and numbers. 
This code was known to Dodge alone throughout the war. 
The final element in Dodge's organization was that of finance. 
Spies held a special station in the military. They never held a rank, 
they remained anonymous, and yet their activities were strictly military. 
Because of this, Dodge could not find funds to pay for his intelligence 
work. Through the sale of contraband cotton Dodge was able to keep his 
spies, scout/spies and detectives in the field throughout much of the 
war. 
In the field Dodge's intelligence work functioned well. In both 
the Vicksburg and Atlanta Campaigns Dodge's spies delivered detailed and 
accurate information. From November 1862 until July 1863, Dodge kept 
spies in the major urban and railway centers east of Vicksburg. Dodge's 
orders were to detect any movements Confederate Generals Braxton Bragg 
and Joseph E. Johnston made to the rear of Grant's army then in front of 
Vicksburg. To combat Confederate cavalry activities between Dodge's army 
at Corinth and Grant's at Vicksburg, Dodge seems to have relied heavily 
on his scout/spies. Through the information sent from his spies in 
southern cities and railway centers Dodge could locate Confederate 
cavalry. Yet cavalry units seldom stayed long in one location. When 
they left a city they usually were not heard of again until they had 
completed a raid. Dodge's scout/spies worked with his cavalry. In the 
field they often wore Confederate uniforms and rode just ahead of a 
cavalry unit. When the scout/spy learned the location of a Confederate 
cavalry, he would ride back to his own men and they would begin their 
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pursuit. Through this type of operation Dodge appears to have controlled 
a great many of the Confederate cavalry raids. 
While Dodge's scout/spies concentrated on the Confederate cavalry 
in the countryside, his regular spies kept General Grant posted on the 
location, size, and plans of the Confederate armies. Grant used this 
information to draw adequate reinforcements from General Schofield's 
army in Missouri in order to send them to General Sherman's army east of 
Vicksburg. This enabled Grant to keep his army around Vicksburg while 
General Sherman kept Joseph E. Johnston's army from making any serious 
attempt to relieve the city. It would seem fair to conclude that Dodge's 
intelligence reports enable General Grant to capture Vicksburg sooner 
than he would have had he not received them. 
Prior to the Atlanta Campaign Dodge ordered his division commanders 
to recruit new spies and scouts. This, plus the geographical area in 
which they operated, were the only significant differences between Dodge's 
intelligence operations in both campaigns. The campaign for Atlanta began 
in May 1864 and ended in September 1864. During this period Dodge sent 
Sherman and Grant constant intelligence reports. 
After recuperating from his serious wound following the Battle of 
Atlanta, Dodge was ordered to St. Louis. There he was made commander of 
Missouri. Missouri was a typical border state of the Civil War: torn 
internally, and impossible to pacify compl etely. 
Guerrilla warfare was one of the most pressing problems Dodge had to 
deal with in Missouri. The state was divided into districts. The 
commander of each district sent out spies, scouts, and cavalry in order 
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to combat the guerrillas who traversed the state. Dodge required his 
district commanders to send semi-monthly reports to Dodge's headquarters 
in St. Louis. 
In addition to the guerrilla war Dodge used his spies against the 
Indians on the plains. The Indians were unaware of Dodge's spies, thus 
Dodge was able to keep tabs on them and prevent them from completely 
surprising settlements and forts on the plains. Dodge also used detec-
tives to uncover and break up several Confederate conspiracies. The most 
important one involved several men who by burning Union steamboats hoped 
to disrupt supply lines on the Missouri River. 
In five years of war, Dodge used the various parts of his 
intelligence operations in ten states: Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, 
Tennessee, Missouri, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Louisiana and Arkansas; 
and in territory now the states of wyoming and Nebraska. Dodge always 
relied heavily on intelligence information. He never gave up on it. 
Several years following the war, Dodge reviewed his intelligence informa-
tion and was impressed by its accuracy. 1 As his most recent biographer 
states: "With his raids and secret service work, Dodge clearly made up 
in shrewdness and zeal what he lacked in military brilliance."2 
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APPENDIX I 
Intelligence Report: Atlanta Campaign 
April 8, 1864 
Left Rienzi, Mississippi March 15th, 1864. Met Forrest at Tupelo, 
he had rations issued to 4800 horses. Buford's division was with him, 
his troops are all Tennesseeians and Kentuckians. Left, General Polk's 
headquarters at Demopolis, March 26th. Cars can run, to Tibbee bridge on 
M.&O.R.R. Cars not running from Meridian to Selma but men are at work on 
it. Polk was to move to Meridian as soon as the road was finished. He 
has 10,000 troops. French and Lorings besides some 3000 Vicksburg 
prisoners in camp not armed. No troops have gone from Polk to Johnson 
since Sherman was there. Nothing at Columbus, Miss. Lee and Adams are 
towards Vicksburg. Left Selma March 26th, nothing there. A good deal 
of army work going on there. Left Montgomery March 27th, nothing there. 
Left Atlanta March 28th, considerable number of troops there. All state 
troops. General Morgan with his command left on the 26th going north-
east. Was going up to Longstreet's army. Said to have 6,000 men all 
mounted. Left Atlanta March 28th, went to Rome, Ga. General Brown's 
brigade at Rome, very small force not to exceed 1500. Men are at work 
on battery covering the crossing of the Oostamanda. Passed 21 cars 
loaded with pontoon bridges at Kingston going to Dalton. They also 
had a large amount of pontoons at Atlanta and were building them there, 
and at Selma and Demopolis. Johnson has about 45,000 men all told, 
infantry, cavalry and artillery. Most of his army, say 35,000 is at and 
about Dalton. It is the general impression that Johnson is getting ready 
to move. He has a considerable stock of provisions on hand ready. 
Johnson keeps his lines closed, allows no persons in or out. It is the 
general talk that Grant has taken a large force from our front to 
Washington. The movement in our right at Decatur, etc. they are watching 
closely. Have a courier line to Rome and do not know what to make of it. 
Went back to Rome to West Point, Ga., left there April 2nd, came up 
and crossed Blue Mountains, left there April 2nd; at that point, Martin's 
division of cavalry had just arrived to recruit, and move 15 miles south; 
also three batteries that had been stationed there to recruit had gone 
to the front. Few cavalry left at Gadsden. Clanton left Saturday, 
crossed the mountains at Summit, thence to Oostamanda, thence to Whites-
burg, thence to Flint River where he was this morning. Our mounted 
forces were skirmishing with him at Flint River. 
Johnson is in good spirits, and at all other points despondent. 
They do not increase the army by the conscript act very much. It is the 
general belief that Sherman intends to turn their left by way of Coosa 
Valley, but it is the general rumor that Johnson intends to turn out 
left. They believe Thomas has only a small force, that Grant is 
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accumulating some 250,000 men in front of Richmond and has weakened 
Sherman to do it. At Rome the scouts saw an [ ] who was collecting 
100 artillery horses, and he said Johnson was about ready, he had 1000 
wagons loaded with commissary stores. The scout also saw that it was 
talked generally that Forrest was to cross to our right. Morgan on our 
left and break out communications. Morgan , Forrest and S. D. Lee were 
on consultation at Columbus, Miss. before Forrest moved north. This 
was from March 12th to 15th. So far what the scout saw the report is 
reliable and he is a shrewd observer and one of my best men. He gives 
the rumors as he heard them. 
All the talk of officers was that Johnson intends to take initia-
tive. All furloughs have been stopped. No troops since March 11th of 
any account have either moved east or west. Johnson's army is fed 
almost entirely from south Alabama and a large amount of produce goes 
from S.W. Ga. to Lee's Army. Stores in considerable quantities are 
accumulating at Atlanta to Blue Mountains over Selma and Rome Railroad. 
The scout says everything north of Atlanta is virtually skinned and the 
road he travelled from West Point to Blue Mountains is very poor, and 
the first good country he struck was around Jacksonville, Benton County. 
Columbus, Ga. is being extensively fortified. 
Forrest left his trains at Tupelo and it is engaged hauling corn 
to that point. Two soldiers belonging to General Smith's command, 
wounded in the fight at Okalona, were killed in the hospital at 
Aberdien by some of Forrest's men. It created considerable excitement 
and indignation among the citizens. Lt. General Polk said if Smith 
had reached Sherman he would have gone to Selma and they could not have 
stopped him. H2 (Polk) said he estimated Sherman's forces at about 
20,000 men. Scout had orders from General Forrest, General Polk, 
Atlanta, Rome etc. He says they all say their army is today at its 
maximum and that they cannot increase it. Every point he was at he 
saw gangs of deserters at work in chains and met them on all trains. 
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APPENDIX II 
Intelligence Report: Confederate Activity in 
and Around the Red River Area 
March 8, 1865 
Capt. J. McC Bell. 
Asst. Adjt.-Gen. Military Div. of the Mo. 
Captain: The following information derived from reports of scouts and 
from Lt. Col. Hayes, Twelfth Kansas Infantry, who has been a prisoner of 
war at Camden, Shreveport, Magnolia and other points in southwest since 
April 1st on parole, is submitted for the information of the Major 
General commanding the Military division of the Missouri. Two weeks ago 
the enemy's forces were holding a line from Washington to Camden, thence 
down the Washita to near Alexandria, thence south. Their forces were 
posted as follows: At Alexandria, Buckner with his division; at Grand 
Ecore, a small force at work on intrenchments; at Minden, twenty-five 
miles east of Shreveport, Churchill's division 9000 strong; Marmaduke's 
old division, Cabell's and Slemons's division watching the Washita; 
Shelby's division in northwest Texas, headquarters at Clarksville; 
Walker's division, now commanded by Forney, at Shreveport, where Kirby 
Smith's headquarters are. Magruder commands at Arkansas. He has a small 
force posted at Washington and at Camden (now said to be withdrawn) also 
a force at Boggy Depot. At Shreveport there are two iron-clads and on 
the Red River fifteen transports. Their troops, except the old Missouri 
veterans, are poorly armed, badly equipped, and in a very poor state of 
discipline. All guerrillas and conscripts taken out by Price were 
dismounted, and placed in the infantry. Many are deserting and most of 
the guerrilla bands are working back into Missouri. The troops fear a 
campaign against them this spring, either up the Red River or by way of 
Arkansas, and most of the troops are so disposed as to meet such an 
advance. 
Price's raid is considered a disaster, and there is no talk now 
of another, except in case no campaign is made by us against them. They 
look for a movement against them and hold that they can concentrate 
40,000 men against us, but admits that if one is made in force they will 
have to fall back into Texas. There is no doubt that a large number of 
guerrillas and conscripts are preparing to come back into Missouri so 
soon as leaves come, and that they believe Canby or Reynolds are about 
making another campaign against them. Orders from Richmond have reached 
there to transfer those troops to the east side of the Mississippi River. 
Many of the officers are in favor of it, but the soldiers, especially 
those from Texas, Louisiana and Arkansas will not go. Officers admit 
that to do it they will have to break up into small parties and they 
believe if they do this they will never be able to get the men together 
again. It is certain that the Missouri troops are the nucleus around 
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which the army is held and is the element that holds it together. Many 
circumstances are related clearly proving this fact. When Walker tried 
to cross the Mississippi his troops mutinied. A rebel captain was 
ordered shot for being a leader in it and he had t o be executed by 
Missouri soldiers, as none others would do it. No efforts had been made 
two weeks ago to cross any troops to east side of the Mississippi. 
Colonel Hayes thinks when they ascertain that no campaign is being made 
against them, they wi ll make an eff ort to do this; but it will fail and 
they will, in the attempt, lose a l arge number of men from desertion, 
and to satisfy the Missouri troops a campaign will be made against the 
posts in upper Arkansas and Kansas. All able-bodied negroes were being 
forcibly collected in camps, but as yet none had been organized and 
armed as soldiers. 
I am, Captain, very respectfully your obedient servant, 
G. M. Dodge, 
Major-General 
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE 
The most important source used in this thesis was the Grenville 
Dodge Papers. The Dodge Papers are located in the Iowa State Department 
of History, Division of Historical Museums and Archives in Des Moines. 
These papers are Quite extensive and cover his entire life. Boxes 99, 
148, and 149 were of particular value. These contain Dodge's secret 
service pay vouchers, documents, and accounts of individual spies -. 
Dodge destroyed most of the intelligence reports he received from 
other generals and few of his own are in his papers. However, most of 
them can be found throughout the 128 volumes of the Compilation of the 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, and the 112 volumes 
of the Ulysses S. Grant Papers. Several other rep~rts relevant to Dodge's 
intelligence operations are also in the Records of the United States Army 
Continental Commands: 16th Army Corps. 
Military accounts served as good sources for this study. The 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies 
has already been cited. Ulysses S. Grant's, Personal Memoirs, Joseph E. 
Johnston's, Narrative of Military Operations, Dodge's , Personal Biography 
and his Battle of Atlanta and Other Campaigns, were also of great value. 
Kenneth P. Williams's, Lincoln Finds a General is an excellent source. 
Williams's 5 volume study is comprehensive and contains good accounts of 
both the Vicksburg and Atlanta campaigns. An excellent account of the 
Vicksburg campaign is EarlS. Miers's Web of Victory, and Peter F. 
Walker's Vicksburg: A People at War, 1860-1865. Stanley R. Horn's 
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The Army of Tennessee is a fairly good account of Confederate strategy 
and condition during the Vicksburg and Atlanta campaigns. William Key's 
The Battle of Atlanta is concise and fairly good on Sherman's entire 
Georgia campaign. A good reference for t he locations from day to day 
of both the Union and Confederate armies is E. B. and Barbara Long's 
The Civil War Day by Day. 
Several biographies have been written on Dodge. The best and most 
recent is Stanley Hirshon's Grenville M. Dodge: Soldier, Politician, 
Railroad Pioneer. J. R. Perkins's Trails, Rails and War: The Life of 
General G. M. Dodge, is good but tends to be biased in Dodge's favor. 
Both Hirshon and Perkins cover Dodge's entire life. J. T. Granger's 
A Brief Biographical Sketch of the Life of Major-General Grenville M. 
Dodge, places more emphasis on Dodge's military and railroad career. 
There are short accounts of Dodge's secret service work in both 
the Hirshon and Perkins biographies. Of the two, Stanley Hirshon's is 
the best. In addition to these there are references to Dodge and his 
military intelligence operations in John Bakeless's Spies of the 
Confederacy and Edwin Fishel's article, "The Mythology of Civil War 
Intelligence", in Civil War History, vol. 10, 1964. 
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